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INTRODUCTION
When the owners of the controversial bit-torrent website,
The Pirate Bay, were charged with criminal offenses for
violating copyright law, 1 they asserted their right to freedom
of expression as a constitutional right, as well as under the
Noting that
European Convention on Human Rights. 2
copyright is protected not only by statute, but also under the
applicable human rights law, the court sought to balance the
human right to freedom of expression against the human
right to property. 3 The court noted that the right to property
includes intellectual property. 4 Thus, the European court
balanced the human right to free speech against the human
right to copyright as a form of property. Interpreted as a
limited statutory right, copyright should be accorded less
weight than the human right to free speech. 5 However, as
human rights, neither the right to copyright nor the right to
1. Neij v. Sweden, App. No. 40397/12 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 2013),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-117513.
2. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms art. 10, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter Convention].
3. Neij, App. No. 40397/12.
4. Id.
5. In the United States, copyright law recognizes the First Amendment
right to free speech as part of the balancing that is implicit in the law. Harper
& Row Publ’rs, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 556 (1985) (“ The Second
Circuit noted, correctly, that copyright’s idea/expression dichotomy ‘[strikes] a
definitional balance between the First Amendment and the Copyright Act by
permitting free communication of facts while still protecting an author’s
expression.’ ”). The current argument assumes that countries respect human
rights as inalienable rights that should not be violated. However, this is not the
practice in all countries. See, e.g., Panel Report, China – Measures Affecting the
Protection and Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights, WT/DS362/R (Jan.
26, 2009) (some of China’s censorship laws and their impact on copyright were
at issue in this dispute). Nor is it consistently the practice in countries that do
recognize human rights.
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free speech would necessarily take precedence over the other. 6
A human rights approach to intellectual property has
been suggested as one way to achieve greater balance in what
many commentators perceive to be a global intellectual
property system that has led to excessive protection. 7
Intellectual property rights play an important role in society.
The challenge, however, is to construct intellectual property
rules that stimulate innovation in a manner that is conducive
to social and economic welfare. 8
The “human rights framework” uses human rights norms
to interpret and develop intellectual property laws. There are
two ways in which human rights norms can interact with
intellectual property law. First, human rights law can be
used to limit intellectual property rights. For instance, if one
considers the human right to health when interpreting patent
rights, the government obligation to protect patents could be
limited so that it does not interfere with access to medicines. 9
This use of human rights to temper intellectual property can
be characterized as a response to the global harmonization of
intellectual property laws. A second aspect of the human
6. James W. Nickel, Rethinking Indivisibility: Towards A Theory of
Supporting Relations between Human Rights, 30 HUM. RTS. Q. 984, 984–85
(2008). While in principle there is no hierarchy of rights, this does not always
reflect the reality of human rights law insofar as civil and political rights are
often given greater recognition than economic, social and cultural rights.
7. See Audrey R. Chapman, A Human Rights Perspective on Intellectual
Property, Scientific Progress, and Access to the Benefits of Science, Panel
Discussion on Intellectual Property and Human Rights (Nov. 9, 1998); Laurence
R. Helfer, Human Rights and Intellectual Property: Conflict or Coexistence?, 5
MINN. INTELL. PROP. REV. 47 (2003); Peter K. Yu, Reconceptualizing Intellectual
Property Interests in a Human Rights Framework, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1039
(2007); Lea Shaver, The Right to Science and Culture, 2010 WIS. L. REV. 121;
Laurence R. Helfer, Toward a Human Rights Framework for Intellectual
Property, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 971, 975 (2007).
8. See Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization, Annex 1C, reprinted in THE LEGAL TEXTS: THE RESULTS OF THE
URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS 320 (1999), 1869
U.N.T.S. 299, 33 I.L.M. 1197 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement] (Article 7,
Objectives, states: ”[t]he protection and enforcement of intellectual property
rights should contribute to the promotion of technological innovation and to the
transfer and dissemination of technology, to the mutual advantage of producers
and users of technological knowledge and in a manner conducive to social and
economic welfare, and to a balance of rights and obligations.”).
9. For example, under Articles 27 and 28 of the TRIPS Agreement, all
WTO members have an obligation to provide patent protection to inventions
from other WTO member countries.
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rights approach is the characterization of intellectual
property protection as a human right. The right to patent,
trademark, or copyright protection is not typically considered
a human right.
However, provisions in the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights 10 (UDHR) and other human
rights instruments support the proposition that some aspects
of what we understand to be copyright or patent protection
are human rights. 11 Initially, this may seem appealing to
social justice advocates. As this Article will argue, however, a
human right to intellectual property protection is more likely
to expand intellectual property rights than to counter the
negative effects of excessive intellectual property protection.
In particular, it is often assumed that corporations are
naturally excluded from asserting human rights to their
intellectual property. 12 However, corporations have used
human rights law as a basis for their intellectual property
claims. 13
The characterization of these rights is important because
framing patents and copyrights as property rights, natural
rights, or human rights can impact their legal treatment.
The state may place limitations on some rights more easily
than others depending on the theoretical underpinnings of
the right. For instance, we may treat the rights differently
depending on whether we conceive of them as natural
rights—like human rights 14—or as privileges. We might
10. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/217(III) (Dec. 10, 1948) [hereinafter UDHR].
11. Id. at 71. See also Laurence R. Helfer, Human Rights and Intellectual
Property: Conflict or Coexistence?, 5 MINN. INTELL. PROP. REV. 47 (2003). There
appears to be some overlap with patent and copyright protection but not with
trademark, except to the extent that a trademark right is considered a property
right.
12. Audrey R. Chapman, Core Obligations Related to ICESCR Article
15(1)(C), in CORE OBLIGATIONS: BUILDING A FRAMEWORK FOR ECONOMIC,
SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS 305, 316–317 (Audrey Chapman & Sage Russell
eds., 2002).
13. See Annheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Portugal, App. No. 73049/01, 45 Eur. H.R.
Rep. 36 (Grand Chamber 2007).
14. Jack Donnelly, Human Rights as Natural Rights, 4(3) HUM. RTS. Q. 391,
391 (1982). Human rights are “fundamental and inalienable” rights that are
enjoyed by all human beings by virtue of being human. They are generally
understood to be natural rights as understood by Locke. Id. While human
rights are widely understood to be natural rights, some theorists have argued
that human rights are not natural rights but rather that they are based on a
social justice model. Id. at 392.
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inquire whether the rights at issue are fundamental 15 rights
or limited state-granted rights. These characterizations also
affect our understanding of the nature of the persons or
groups who are entitled to the rights, as well as the way the
rights are balanced.
Since intangible rights are tremendously valuable in the
current
information
economy,
the
treatment
and
characterization of rights is a salient question for domestic
and international intellectual property law. A fundamental
constitutional right, 16 like freedom of speech or the right to
own property, 17 may also be an international human right. 18
This is because the human rights framework is based on
international principles, but these rights are typically
embodied in domestic constitutions and enforced by national
governments. 19
This Article contemplates the potential impact of human
15. Theodor Meron, On a Hierarchy of International Human Rights, 80 AM.
J. INT’L L. 1, 5 (1986) (“ [T]he terms ‘human rights,’ ‘freedoms,’ ‘fundamental
human rights,’ fundamental freedoms,’ ‘rights and freedoms’ and, most
commonly, ‘human rights and fundamental freedoms’ appear, in general, to be
used interchangeably. This practice suggests that there is no substantive or
definable legal difference between these terms. In these instruments at least,
‘human rights’ are not inferior to ‘fundamental’ rights and freedoms. They are
the same.”).
16. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 674 (6th ed. 1990) (defining “fundamental
rights” as “[t]hose rights which have their source, and are explicitly or implicitly
guaranteed, in the federal Constitution . . . and state constitutions.”).
17. See U.S. CONST. amend. V.
The Bill of Rights, comprised of
Amendments I–X of the Constitution, provides for the protection of property.
Amendment V states, in part, that no person shall “be deprived of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for
public use, without just compensation.” Id. UDHR Article 17 states, “1)
Everyone has the right to own property alone as well as in association with
others, 2) No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his property.” UDHR, supra
note 10, art. 17.
18. Mary W. S. Wong, Toward an Alternative Normative Framework for
Copyright: From Private Property to Human Rights, 26 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT.
L.J. 775, 806 (2009).
19. Jack Donnelly, The Relative Universality of Human Rights, 29 HUM.
RTS. Q. 281, 283 (2007) (“The global human rights regime relies on national
implementation of internationally recognized human rights. Norm creation has
been internationalized. Enforcement of authoritative international human
rights norm, however, is left almost entirely to sovereign states.”); HENRY J.
STEINER & PHILIP ALSTON, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONTEXT: LAW,
POLITICS, MORALS 987–88 (2d ed. 2000) (“This section looks at one of the
important phenomena of the past 50 years or so: the spread among many states
of constitutions expressing political (and sometimes economic) liberalism, and
often recognizing human rights.”).
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rights principles on intellectual property law, particularly if
corporations seek to protect their intellectual property
interests based on human rights laws. For instance, the
American corporation that owns the Budweiser trademark
made a property-based human rights claim to its trademarks
under the European Convention on Human Rights. 20 Yet, the
question of corporate-owned intellectual property within a
human rights framework for intellectual property remains
relatively unexplored and unsettled. 21 If the goal is to treat
the entitlement to intellectual property rights as a human
right, the human rights framework is likely to strengthen,
rather than temper intellectual property rights. However,
where human rights objectives are used to limit intellectual
property rights, the framework is likely to achieve its stated
objective: bringing more balance to the intellectual property
system.
The argument here is not that corporations enjoy human
rights per se or that they should be entitled to such rights.
Rather, as the human rights framework evolves, it is
important to anticipate that corporations will continue to
seek to protect their intellectual property interests. In light
of the upward trend in intellectual property protection,
corporations may attempt to frame intellectual property
rights using a human rights lens, even if they do not
explicitly make human rights claims. This Article recognizes
that intellectual property law can benefit from human rights
concepts. However, engaging with some of the theoretical
challenges presented by a human rights framework for
intellectual property may be useful as the framework is
developed and tailored to meet its balancing objectives.
Part I of the Article discusses the global trend towards
increased intellectual property protection and the resulting
human rights concerns. It then goes on to explain the
relevance of corporations to the human rights framework. In
Part II, the Article explains the human rights basis for
claiming intellectual property protection. Part III analyzes

20. Annheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Portugal, App. No. 73049/01, 45 Eur. H.R.
Rep. 36, ¶ 78 (Grand Chamber 2007).
21. LAURENCE R. HELFER & GRAEME W. AUSTIN, HUMAN RIGHTS AND
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: MAPPING THE GLOBAL INTERFACE (Cambridge Univ.
Press 2011).
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the human rights framework for intellectual property and its
potential impact on intellectual property law. Finally, the
Article elaborates on the relationship between corporations
and human rights and offers some preliminary suggestions
for limiting corporate human-rights-based intellectual
property claims.
I.

GLOBAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY TENSIONS

A. Critiques of the Existing Framework
Most commentators agree that there has been an
increasing amount of tension in the international intellectual
Enforceable global
property system in recent years. 22
minimum standards for intellectual property were
established for the first time in 1994 when the World Trade
Organization (WTO) was created. 23 These standards include
minimum terms of protection for copyright, patents, and
trademarks and a requirement to provide patent protection
for all fields of technology. 24 Prior to this time, nations
maintained a fair amount of discretion regarding their
domestic intellectual property laws.
Increased global
intellectual property standards were driven largely by private
industry in the United States and Europe. 25 The WTO’s
minimum intellectual property standards came into effect in
1995 through the Agreement on Trade-Related Intellectual
Property Rights (“TRIPS”), 26 an agreement to which all
22. Laurence R. Helfer, Toward a Human Rights Framework for Intellectual
Property, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 971, 973 (2007) (“The international intellectual
property system is on the brink of a deepening crisis. Government officials, civil
society groups, and private parties are staking out opposing positions on a
variety of issues in an increasingly wide range of venues.”).
23. WTO Agreement: Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization, Apr. 15, 1994, reprinted in THE LEGAL TEXTS: THE RESULTS OF
THE URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS 4 (1999), 1867
U.N.T.S. 154, 33 I.L.M. 1144 (1994) [hereinafter WTO Agreement]; TRIPS
Agreement, supra note 8, at 320.
24. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 8, arts. 9–21, 27–34.
25. JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, MAKING GLOBALIZATION WORK 116 (Norton &
Company, 2007) (“[T]he corporate interests that care intensely about
intellectual property have succeeded in getting more and more of what they
want . . . . This was exemplified by the influence of these corporate interests in
the adoption of the TRIPS agreement within the WTO.”).
26. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 8, art. 65.1 (“Subject to the provisions of
paragraphs 2, 3 and 4, no Member shall be obliged to apply the provisions of
this Agreement before the expiry of a general period of one year following the
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members of the WTO member countries had to adhere. 27
Once TRIPS came into force, all WTO members had to meet
the minimum standards contained therein, regardless of
whether the standards were suitable for their domestic
conditions. 28
The TRIPS standards were designed primarily for the
benefit of industrialized countries with intellectual property
intensive industries, whose interests were sometimes at odds
with those of the developing and least developed economies. 29
While the least developed countries were given an extended
deadline to implement their TRIPS obligations, developing
countries had to comply with TRIPS once the five-year grace
period ended in 2000. 30 Although some countries were
pleased with the standards, many others were dissatisfied.31
Some nations consider the standards inadequate and have
continued to press for increased intellectual property
protections through other bilateral or multilateral
agreements. 32
date of entry into force of the WTO Agreement.”).
27. Article II.2 of the WTO Agreement states, “ [t]he agreements and
associated legal instruments included in Annexes 1, 2 and 3 (hereinafter
referred to as ‘Multilateral Trade Agreements’ ) are integral parts of this
Agreement, binding on all Members.” WTO Agreement, supra note 23, art. II.2.
The TRIPS Agreement is Annex 1C. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 8.
28. There was, however, a delayed period of entry for developing country
members. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 8, arts. 65–66. For a fuller discussion
on the suitability of TRIPS for all countries, see J. Osei-Tutu, Value Divergence
in Global Intellectual Property Law, 87 IND. L.J. 1639 (2012).
29. Marie Byström & Peter Einarsson, TRIPS: Consequences for Developing
Countries Implications for Swedish Development Cooperation 48–49 (2001)
(consultancy report to the Swedish International Development Cooperation
Agency (SIDA)), available at http://www.grain.org/system/old/docs/sida-trips2001-en.PDF.
30. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 8, arts. 65–66. The least developed
countries were given an extension of time until July 1, 2013, and then again
until July 1, 2021. See Extension of the Transition Period Under Article 66.1
for Least-Developed Country Members: Decision of the Council for TRIPS of 29
November 2005, IP/C/40 (Nov. 30, 2005); Extension of the Transition Period
Under Article 66.1 for Least-Developed Country Members: Decision of the
Council for TRIPS of 11 June 2013, IP/C/64 (June 12, 2013).
31. CARLOS M. CORREA, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, THE WTO AND
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: THE TRIPS AGREEMENT AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
(2000).
32. Peter K. Yu, Shaping Chinese Criminal Enforcement Norms Through
the TRIPS Agreement, in CRIMINAL ENFORCEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY: A HANDBOOK OF CONTEMPORARY RESEARCH 286, 286–87
(Christophe Geiger ed. 2012).
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Thus, since the adoption of TRIPS, there have been a
number of agreements described as “TRIPS plus” intellectual
property agreements that build on the minimum standards
that TRIPS introduced. 33 Industry associations continue to
press for strong intellectual property standards in these
“TRIPS plus” agreements, such as the Trans-Pacific
Partnership negotiations. 34 Negotiations on a Trans-Atlantic
Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) began in 2013.35
The stated goals for the TTIP negotiations include the
development of “rules, principles[,] and new modes of
cooperation” relating to intellectual property. 36 It is expected
that this agreement will further strengthen intellectual
property protections. 37
Simultaneously, there have been numerous critiques of
these globalized intellectual property standards and the
deleterious effects intellectual property rights can have on
human health and access to knowledge. Many academics and
commentators view the current intellectual property laws as
overprotective. 38 In particular, commentators have expressed
concern about the way patent and copyright laws affect
developing countries that have yet to reach the level of
33. Cynthia M. Ho, An Overview of “TRIPS-Plus” Standards, in ACCESS TO
MEDICINE IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY: INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS ON PATENTS
AND RELATED RIGHTS (C. Ho ed. 2011).
34. Letter from Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America
(PhMRA) to Gloria Blue, Exec. Sec’y of the Trade Policy Staff Comm., Exec.
Office of the President 4, USTR-2009-0041 (Jan. 25, 2010), available at
http://www.wcl.american.edu/pijip/go/tpp.
35. Office of the United States Trade Representative, Transatlantic Trade
and Investment Partnership (T-TIP), http://www.ustr.gov/ttip.
36. Office of the United States Trade Representative, White House Fact
Sheet: Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (T-TIP), available at
http://www.ustr.gov/about-us/press-office/fact-sheets/2013/june/wh-ttip.
37. Alex Newman, TTIP of the iceberg – what the Transatlantic Trade and
Investment Partnership means for lawyers on both sides of the Pond,
LEGALWEEK
(Feb.
12,
2014),
http://www.legalweek.com/legalweek/analysis/2327975/ttip-of-the-iceberg-what-the-transatlantic-trade-andinvestment-partnership-trade-deal-means-for-lawyers-on-both-sides-of-theatlantic.
38. See, e.g., Kal Raustiala, Density and Conflict in International
Intellectual Property Law, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1021, 1030 (2007); see also
James Boyle, The Second Enclosure Movement and the Construction of the
Public Domain, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 33, 37–41 (2003) (describing the
expansion of intellectual property rights); LAWRENCE LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF
IDEAS: THE FATE OF THE COMMONS IN A CONNECTED WORLD (Random House
2001).
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development where these laws are useful for domestic
industry. 39 Scholars and activists have critiqued the effect of
patents on access to medicines, and the effect of copyright
laws on access to knowledge. 40 Arguably, the “access to
medicines” movement and the “access to knowledge”
movement formed in response to increased global intellectual
property standards. 41 For instance, there was an attempt to
create an international agreement on access to knowledge.42
In addition, the WTO member states issued a Declaration on
TRIPS and Public Health that stated that intellectual
property rights should not interfere with access to
medicines. 43
The human rights framework appears to be a further
critical response to these strengthened intellectual property
rights, and one that is pertinent to the access to medicines
movement, the access to knowledge movement, 44 and the
proposal for a new traditional knowledge right. 45 The human
rights framework is a potentially powerful model for
reforming global intellectual property law. It could help to
counter excessive intellectual property rights, but it could
39. Margaret Chon, Intellectual Property and the Development Divide, 27
CARDOZO L. REV. 2821 (2006).
40. See Frederick M. Abbott, TRIPS in Seattle: The Not-So-Surprising
Failure and the Future of the TRIPS Agenda, 18 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 165,
171 (2000) (noting the patent related health concerns of developing country
members); Helfer, supra note 22, at 984–86; Charles R. McManis, Intellectual
Property, Genetic Resources and Traditional Knowledge Protection: Thinking
Globally, Acting Locally, 11 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 547, 548–51 (2003)
(discussing the North-South division and the negative reaction of farmers in
India to the TRIPS Agreement).
41. See, e.g., Geneva Declaration on the Future of the World Intellectual
Property
Organization,
available
at
http://www.futureofwipo.org/futureofwipodeclaration.pdf. In this document, a
number of members of civil society expressed their concern about the future of
the WIPO (“ WIPO must also express a more balanced view of the relative
benefits of harmonization and diversity, and seek to impose global conformity
only when it truly benefits all of humanity. A ‘one size fits all’ approach that
embraces the highest levels of intellectual property protection for everyone
leads to unjust and burdensome outcomes for countries that are struggling to
meet the most basic needs of their citizens.”).
42. Treaty on Access to Knowledge (Draft), May 9, 2005, available at
http://www.cptech.org/a2k/a2k_treaty_may9.pdf.
43. World Trade Organization, Ministerial Declaration of 14 November
2001, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1, 41 I.L.M. 746 (2002) [hereinafter Doha Declaration].
44. Treaty on Access to Knowledge (Draft), supra note 42.
45. See World Intellectual Property Organization [hereinafter WIPO],
Traditional Knowledge, http://www.wipo.int/tk/en/.
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also enhance protections for intellectual property producers.
The assertion that a human rights framework for
intellectual property does not extend to corporations renders
the human rights approach more consistent with the objective
of tempering the excesses of intellectual property because it
largely excludes those who sought higher intellectual
property standards at the WTO. However, developments in
intellectual property law over the past several years indicate
that businesses—including corporations that own intellectual
property—will seek to protect their rights to the maximum
extent possible. 46 If the purpose of incorporating human
rights principles into intellectual property law is to create a
more balanced system, the potential for large corporations to
utilize the framework is pertinent to the discussion. Yet, the
relationship between corporations and the human rights
framework for intellectual property has received minimal
attention in the literature.
B. Corporate Human Rights Claims to Intellectual
Property
There are three reasons for giving corporations further
consideration. First, the proposed human rights framework
must be considered in context. The relevant context is that
globalized intellectual property standards were driven largely
by the interests of major companies. 47 Furthermore, the
purpose of the merger between trade and intellectual
property was to ensure that the intellectual property held by
American and European companies would be adequately
protected overseas. 48 The trend described as the “ratcheting
up” of intellectual property rights is largely about protecting
business interests.
Intellectual property producing
companies—whether corporations or other business entities—

46. See Mike Palmedo, Notes on Third Hearing of U.S. International Trade
Commission Investigation of Trade, Investment, and Industrial Policies in India,
INFOJUSTICE (Feb. 17, 2004), available at http://infojustice.org/archives/32228.
47. Ruth L. Okediji, Public Welfare and the Role of the WTO: Reconsidering
the TRIPS Agreement, 17 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 819, 858–59 (2003); SUSAN K.
SELL, PRIVATE POWER, PUBLIC LAW: THE GLOBALIZATION OF INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY RIGHTS 97–99 (Cambridge Univ. Press 2003); Chapman, supra note
12 at 308.
48. Marshall A. Leaffer, Protecting United States Intellectual Property
Abroad: Toward a New Multilateralism, 76 IOWA L. REV. 273, 274 (1991).
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will continue to press for higher intellectual property
standards. 49 It is within this context that one must evaluate
the benefit of a human rights approach to intellectual
property law and policy.
Second, states extend human rights protections 50 to legal
persons when they believe there is some basis for doing so. 51
Thus, both legal and natural persons may enjoy the right to
property and the right to free speech, for example, but not a
right to be free from torture. 52 Since a legal person cannot be
tortured, there is no rational basis for extending such rights
to corporations. However, corporations, like natural persons,
own property and can participate in speech, which is why
nations may choose to extend speech, property, or other
human rights to corporations.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, framing
intellectual property rights through a human rights lens can
alter the way we perceive intellectual property rights for both
legal and natural persons. Moreover, the human rights
framing, which is based on a natural rights approach rather
than the current utilitarian approach to intellectual property,
could strengthen, rather than weaken, intellectual property
rights. Contemplating the human rights framework from an
intellectual property perspective, this Article posits that the
same business interests that continue to pursue increased
global intellectual property standards are likely to attempt to
frame human rights claims to their intellectual property.
One may not be inclined to think of large business
corporations enjoying human rights protection to their
copyrights and patents. Yet, there have been instances of
corporations relying on human rights law to protect their

49. See, e.g., Office of the United States Trade Representative, Trans-Pacific
Partnership (TPP) [hereinafter TPP], http://www.ustr.gov/tpp; Office of the
United States Trade Representative, Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement
(ACTA) [hereinafter ACTA], http://www.ustr.gov/acta.
50. Such rights have been more accurately described as rights “akin to
human rights” or “human rights-like” since the rights do not pertain to human
beings. However, for the purposes of this article, I will use the term “human
rights” even when referring to legal persons rather than natural persons.
51. See HELFER & AUSTIN, supra note 21.
52. See Soc’y for Propagation of Gospel in Foreign Parts v. Town of Pawlet,
29 U.S. 480 (1830); Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310
(2010).
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intellectual property rights in Europe. 53
Despite the
ambiguity in the literature about the relationship between
corporations and the human rights framework, there is legal
precedent for recognizing human rights-based intellectual
property claims by legal persons. 54 While these cases are of
limited application as legal precedents, they illustrate the
potential for industry to co-opt a human rights framework in
order to protect corporate-owned intellectual property. 55
In Anheuser-Busch Inc. v. Portugal, 56 (“Budweiser”) the
European Court of Human Rights concluded that corporateowned intellectual property rights are property interests
subject to protection under the human rights framework in
Europe. 57 Although this case has been criticized by some
human rights advocates and interpreted by others as being of
limited application, 58 other commentators view the analysis
as consistent with the objectives of human rights law. 59
In a dispute over the registration of the trademark
“Budweiser,” an American corporation, Anheuser-Busch,
Inc., 60 unsuccessfully sought to protect its trademark rights
under the relevant intellectual property laws. 61 After finally
53. See Annheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Portugal, App. No. 73049/01, 45 Eur. H.R.
Rep. 36 (Grand Chamber 2007).
54. Id. at ¶ 78.
55. Peter K. Yu, Ten Common Questions About Intellectual Property and
Human Rights, 23 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 709, 728–30 (2007); U.N. Econ. & Soc.
Council [ECOSOC], Comm. on Econ., Soc. & Cultural Rights [CESCR], General
Comment No. 17 (2005): The Right of Everyone to Benefit from the Protection of
the Moral and Material Interests Resulting from Any Scientific, Literary or
Artistic Production of Which He or She Is the Author (Article 15, Paragraph 1(c),
of the Covenant) U.N. Doc. E/C.12/GC/17 (Jan. 12, 2006), at 2–3 [hereinafter
General Comment No. 17].
56. Anheuser-Busch, 45 Eur. H.R. Rep. 36.
57. Id.
58. Wong, supra note 18, at 811.
59. HELFER & AUSTIN, supra note 21, at 62.
60. Annheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Portugal, App. No. 73049/01, 45 Eur. H.R.
Rep. 36, ¶ 12 (Grand Chamber 2007) (“The applicant is an American public
company whose registered office is in Saint Louis, Missouri [United States of
America]. It produces and sells beer under the brand name “Budweiser” in a
number of countries around the world.”).
61. Id. ¶ 21 (“In a judgment of 18 July 1998, the Lisbon Court of First
Instance dismissed the appeal. It found that the only intellectual property
eligible for protection under Portuguese law and the Bilateral Agreement was
the “Českobudějovický Budvar” appellation of origin, not the “Budweiser” trade
mark.”). The case, which involved the registration of a trademark in Portugal,
was subsequently appealed to the Lisbon Court of Appeal and the Lisbon
Supreme Court. Id. ¶¶ 22–26.
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losing before the Portuguese Supreme Court, 62 the company
took its case to the European Court of Human Rights to claim
interference with the peaceful enjoyment of its possessions
contrary to Article 1 of Protocol 1 of the European Convention
on Human Rights. The company argued that the Supreme
Court’s decision amounted to an expropriation, 63 contrary to
European human rights law. 64
When Annheuser sought to register its “Budweiser”
trademark in Europe, its registration was opposed by
Budwar, who had registered “Budweiser” as an appellation of
origin. 65 The name “Budweiser” comes from the name
“Budweis”— a German name for the Czech town from which
the beer originates. 66 The Czech company, Budejovicky
Budwar, asserted that a handful of brewers were given the
authority to use the appellation “Budweiser” as early as 1295,
and that Budwar had been selling its “Budweiser” beer since
1895. 67 The term referred not only to the German name of
the town, but also to the special technique used to produce
beers that carried the name “Budweiser.” 68 Annheuser
litigated unsuccessfully in the Portuguese courts. 69
62. Anheuser-Busch, 45 Eur. H.R. Rep. 36.
63. The U.S. equivalent of an “expropriation” is a “taking.”
64. Anheuser-Busch, 45 Eur. H.R. Rep. 36, ¶ 46 (“ Article 1 of Protocol No. 1
reads as follows: ‘Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful
enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of his possessions except
in the public interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law and by
the general principles of international law. The preceding provisions shall not,
however, in any way impair the right of a State to enforce such laws as it deems
necessary to control the use of property in accordance with the general interest
or to secure the payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties.’ ”).
65. Annheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Portugal, App. No. 73049/01, 45 Eur. H.R.
Rep. 36, ¶ 16 (Grand Chamber 2007). The appellation of origin was registered
pursuant to Lisbon Agreement for the Protection of Appellations of Origin and
their International Registration, October 31, 1958, 923 U.N.T.S. 205, as am. An
appellation of origin protects a name that is the name of a country or a
geographic region or locality and where there is some quality or characteristic of
the product that is attributable to its geographic origin.
66. Id. ¶ 14.
67. Id.
68. Id. In 1911 and 1939, Annheuser and Budejovicky Budwar concluded
agreements regarding the sale and distribution of “Budweiser” beer in the
United States, but the agreement did not cover the sale of the beer in Europe.
Id. ¶ 15.
69. Annheuser successfully had the Budwar appellation of origin cancelled
on the basis that it was not an indication of source. Following the cancellation
of Budwar’s appellation of origin, Annheuser’s Budweiser’s trademark was
registered in 1995. The Lisbon Court of Appeal ordered the registration
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Annheuser then lodged a complaint against Portugal under
the ECHR for a violation of its right to the peaceful
enjoyment of its possessions because it had been deprived of
the right to use its trademark. 70
Ultimately, Anheuser was not successful in its claim. 71
For the majority, the question turned on whether Anheuser
had a right of priority with respect to the “Budweiser” mark
Most importantly, from the
at the relevant time. 72
intellectual property perspective, the court explicitly
recognized intellectual property rights as being protected
under the property right provision of the European
Convention on Human Rights. 73
Some commentators have suggested that this case should
not be viewed as support for the proposition that there is a
property-based human right to intellectual property. 74 This is
because a decision of the European Court of Human Rights is
limited to its jurisdiction. Furthermore, the language of the
ECHR is not identical to the language of the Article 17 of the
overturned, and the Portuguese Supreme Court dismissed Annheuser’s appeal.
Id. ¶¶ 18, 19, 22–24.
70. Annheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Portugal, App. No. 73049/01, 45 Eur. H.R.
Rep. 36, ¶¶ 1–3 (Grand Chamber 2007).
71. This included the Paris Convention and TRIPS. The human rights court
took into consideration a Bilateral Agreement between the Czech Republic and
Portugal on appellations of origin and indications of source as well as
international agreements on intellectual property, Community law, and
domestic law. Id. ¶¶ 25–30, 34–35.
72. Id. ¶ 84. The Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights
chose not to interfere with the conclusions of the national court: “[t]hese are
questions whose rightful place was before the domestic courts. The Supreme
Court decided in its judgment of 23 January 2001 to reject the applicant
company’s argument based on an alleged violation of the priority rule. In the
absence of any arbitrariness or manifest unreasonableness, the Court cannot
call into question the findings of the Supreme Court on this point.” Id. at ¶ 85.
73. Id. ¶ 72 (After reviewing cases where property rights had been asserted
with respect to patents and copyrights, the court concluded, “[i]n the light of the
above-mentioned decisions, the Grand Chamber agrees with the Chamber’s
conclusion that Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 is applicable to intellectual property
as such.”); see also Joint Concurring Opinion of Judges Steiner and Hajiyev ¶¶
1–2 (“We agreed with the majority that there has been no violation of Article 1
of Protocol No. 1, but on other grounds. In our view, Article 1 of Protocol No. 1
does apply, in general, to intellectual property. This was accepted by both the
parties but there has never been any clear statement of this principle by the
Court in the past. We therefore agree that Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 is
applicable to intellectual property in general and to a duly registered trade
mark.”).
74. Wong, supra note 18, at 811.
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UDHR and Article 15 (1)(c) of the ICESCR, both of which
provide for the protection of moral and material interests. 75
It has been suggested that because there is no provision for
the protection of moral and material interests under the
ECHR, that there was no alternative to protect the
trademark interest except as a property right. 76
However, there is no reason to assume that one could not
have rights to the material interests in one’s intellectual
creations or that those material interests could not also be
considered property. The two rights do not appear to be
mutually exclusive, and indeed, the right to material
interests coincides with the property interest. 77 Moreover,
there are instances outside of the context of the European
human rights system where property interests have been
asserted in intangible rights. American courts have, in
various instances, treated intellectual property interests as
property rights, 78 and recognized trademarks, trade secrets,
and other intangible rights as property under U.S. law. 79
There is a wealth of U.S. jurisprudence where the courts refer
to some forms of intellectual property as property and have
treated trademarks and trade secrets as constitutionally
protected property. 80
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. General Comment No. 17, supra note 55, at 3 (“Moreover, the realization
of article 15, paragraph1 (c), is dependent on the enjoyment of other human
rights guaranteed in the International Bill of Human Rights and other
international and regional instruments, such as the right to own property alone
as well as in association with others.”); Robert L. Ostergard, Jr., Intellectual
Property: A Universal Human Right?, 21 HUM. RTS. Q. 156, 175 (1999)
(“Everyone has the right to the protection of the moral and material interests
resulting from any scientific, literary, or artistic production of which he is the
author. The basis for such a claim without doubt lies in the Western conception
of property rights. What this implies is that, similar to the ownership of
property, people also have an exclusive right to their ideas, creations, and
inventions.”).
78. James Y. Stern, Property’s Constitution, 101 CALIF. L. REV. 277, 290
(2013) (stating that it may not make a difference to the human rights discussion
whether or not the property is constitutionally protected).
79. Michael A. Carrier, Cabining Intellectual Property Through a Property
Paradigm, 54 DUKE L.J. 1, 10 (2004) (discussing various cases where the courts
have referred to intellectual property rights as “property”).
80. See id. at 10–11 (2004) (discussing various cases where the courts have
referred to intellectual property rights as “property”); see generally Adam
Mossoff, Patents as Constitutional Private Property: The Historical Protection of
Patents Under the Takings Clause, 87 B.U. L. REV. 689 (2007); Adam Mossoff, Is
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As the next section will explain, it is possible to support
the assertion that there is a human right to intellectual
property protection either as property or as the material or
moral interest of the author.
II.

HUMAN RIGHTS TO INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
PROTECTION?

There is a legal basis for the view that intellectual
property protection could be considered a human right. 81
While this claim can be supported, the argument can also be
made that the human rights in question are distinct from
copyright and patent protection. Other scholars have already
engaged in thoughtful analysis of the right to intellectual
property as a human right. 82 Thus, this Article will offer
limited analysis of this issue. It is clear that human rights
instruments offer some basis for claiming a human right to
intellectual property or something similar to an intellectual
property right.
A human right to intellectual property protection may
stem from the obligation to protect the material and moral
interests of the creator. 83 Alternatively, to the extent that one
treats patents, copyrights, trademarks, and other intangible
rights as property, a human right to intellectual property can
be based in the obligation to protect property interests. 84 The
two international human rights instruments that are most
pertinent to the discussion are the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights 85 (UDHR) and the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR). 86
Copyright Property?, 42 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 29 (2005) (noting that the courts
have not recognized patents as constitutionally protected property rights).
81. Chapman, supra note 12, at 316–17.
82. For a comprehensive discussion of the human right to intellectual
property, see Yu, supra note 7; Laurence R. Helfer, Toward a Human Rights
Framework for Intellectual Property, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 971 (2007); Wong,
supra note 18; Yu, supra note 55.
83. UDHR, supra note 10, art. 27; International Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights art. 15(1)(c), Jan. 3, 1976, 993 U.N.T.S. 3
[hereinafter ICESCR].
84. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 17, Mar. 23,
1976, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR].
85. UDHR, supra note 10, art. 17.
86. ICCPR, supra note 84. This agreement is silent with respect to property
as a human right or intellectual property as a human right.
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There are also regional instruments that may provide a
basis for individuals to make human rights based intellectual
property claims, as was done in Budweiser. 87 The European
Union protects human rights through the Charter on
Fundamental Rights, and the Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (commonly
referred to as the European Convention on Human Rights or
ECHR). 88 The American Declaration of the Rights and Duties
of Man (American Declaration) 89 also requires human rights
protections that may intersect with intellectual property law.
While these instruments are applicable only within their
relevant regions, the concepts are pertinent to the broader
discussion.
The following discussion elaborates on the
intersection between human rights and intellectual property.
A. Material and Moral Interests
The precise meaning of the human rights obligations as
they relate to intellectual property law is uncertain and
requires further consideration. 90 However, human rights
bodies have set out some of their interpretations of these
obligations and how they may differ from intellectual
property law. 91 The language of the UDHR and the ICESCR
evokes both patent and copyright law. The right to protect

87. See supra notes 56–57.
88. Convention, supra note 2. The Charter on Fundamental Rights and the
European Convention on Human Rights became binding throughout the EU
through the Treaty of Lisbon. See EUROPA, Fundamental Rights within the
European
Union,
available
at
http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/human_rights/fundamental_rights_with
in_european_union/index_en.htm (“The European Union (EU) attaches great
importance internally to human rights. Its human rights principles are set out
in the Treaty on the European Union and the Charter on Fundamental
Rights.”). The Treaty of Lisbon amended the Treaty on the European Union
and the Treaty Establishing the European Community. See EUROPA, Treaty of
Lisbon, available at http://europa.eu/lisbon_treaty/full_text/index_en.htm (“The
Treaty of Lisbon amends the EU’s two core treaties, the Treaty on European
Union and the Treaty establishing the European Community. The latter is
renamed the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. In addition,
several Protocols and Declarations are attached to the Treaty.”).
89. American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man art. XXIII,
adopted by the Ninth International Conference of American States, Bogotá,
Colombia, May 2, 1948, OEA/Ser. L./V/I.23 Rev. [hereinafter American
Declaration].
90. See General Comment No. 17, supra note 55.
91. Id.
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material and moral interest resulting from literary or artistic
productions sounds similar to copyright protection. 92 The
protection of material and moral interests resulting from
scientific productions may overlap with patent law. 93 The full
scope of these rights is not yet understood, but the United
Nations Committee on Economic Social and Cultural Rights
has offered some guidance in General Comment 17. 94
Specifically, Article 27 (2) states, “Everyone has the right
to the protection of the moral and material interests resulting
from any scientific, literary or artistic production of which he
is the author.” 95 Article 15 (1)(c) of the ICESCR provides for
the protection of material and moral interests through
language similar to that found in the UDHR. 96 The same is
true with respect to Article XIII of the American Declaration,
which provides that everyone “has the right to the protection of
his moral and material interests as regards his inventions or
any literary, scientific or artistic works of which he is the
author.” 97
As the ICESCR Committee observes, the right to benefit
from the protection of the moral and material interests may
not coincide with the level of protection or the means of
protection provided through intellectual property law. 98 The
human right to the material and moral interests in one’s
creations may not be identical to the rights extended by the
In fact,
current intellectual property law framework. 99
intellectual property laws may fall short of protecting rights
to creative works even if those works might be protectable
under a human rights framework. 100 For example, one may
92. Chapman, supra note 12.
93. Id.
94. General Comment No. 17, supra note 55.
95. UDHR, supra note 10, art. 27.
96. ICESCR, supra note 83, art. 15(1) (“The States Parties to the present
Covenant recognize the right of everyone: (a) To take part in cultural life; (b) To
enjoy the benefits of scientific progress and its applications; (c) To benefit from
the protection of the moral and material interests resulting from any scientific,
literary or artistic production of which he is the author.”).
97. American Declaration, supra note 89, art. XIII.
98. General Comment No. 17, supra note 55, ¶ 10 (because the human right
may differ from the scope of intellectual property rights under national law, the
ICESCR Committee stressed the importance of not equating these two different
of rights).
99. Id. ¶¶ 2–3.
100. Wong, supra note 18, at 807.
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be able to claim a human right to a creative work, even if the
work fails to meet the standards for originality in copyright,
or novelty under patent law. 101 However, rights owners will
tend to focus on the areas of overlap to advance their goals
rather than the possible distinctions.
The human right to material interests may overlap with
the right to property. Some commentators contend that the
property right articulated in Article 17 of the UDHR may not
be the basis for the right to the protection of material
interests. 102 However, others have argued that the right to
“material interests” implies a right to own property. 103 Even
if one concludes that a material interest is something less
than a property right, the language suggests some kind of
proprietary or pecuniary interest.
B. The Right to Property
As one scholar argues, if the right to own property is a
human right, and if copyright, trademarks, and patents are
treated as property, then one might reasonably conclude that
intellectual property rights are human rights. 104 Although
controversial in some respects, 105 the right to own property
and not to be arbitrarily deprived thereof, is an international
human right. 106 The Universal Declaration of Human Rights
(UDHR) protects property rights, which arguably include
intellectual property rights. Article 17 (1) of the UDHR
states:

101. In order to obtain a patent, an applicant must demonstrate that their
invention is new, useful and non-obvious. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 8, art.
27.
102. Yu, supra note 55, at 734.
103. Wong, supra note 18, at 813–14.
104. Id. at 810 (“[I]nsofar as property ownership is a fundamental human
right . . . and IPRs are property rights, it follows that IPRs are human rights.”).
105. Icelandic Human Rights Centre, The Right to Property (Nov. 15, 2013),
available at http://www.humanrights.is/the-human-rights project/humanrightsc
asesandmaterials/humanrightsconceptsideasandfora/substantivehumanrights/t
herighttoproperty/ (“ One of the more controversial and complex human rights is
the right to property. The right is controversial because the very right which is
seen by some as central to the human rights concept is considered by others to
be an instrument for abuse, a right that protects the ‘haves’ against the ‘havenots.’ It is complex, because no other human right is subject to more
qualifications and limitations and, consequently, no other right has resulted in
more complex case-law of, for instance, the supervisory bodies of the ECHR.”).
106. UDHR, supra note 10, art. 17.
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1) Everyone has the right to own property alone as well as
in association with others,
2) No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his property. 107

One could dispute the treatment of intangible property
rights as “property” due to the differences between tangible
property and rights in intangible goods. 108 Indeed, the
rationale for treating property as fundamental rights,
including the desire to promote social order and stability,
should arguably not be extended to intangible goods. 109
Nonetheless, courts have been willing to treat intellectual
property rights as property interests, including within the
human rights context. 110 If patents, copyrights, trademarks
and other intangible rights are treated as property, then this
provides an additional basis for human rights claims.
Although some may question whether or not the right to
property in the UDHR includes private property, 111 there is
support for the view that the property rights referred to in
human rights instruments include both communal and
private property. The right to property in Article 17 of the
UDHR generated a significant amount of debate because
some countries, like the United States, supported a right to
private property, while others, like the former Soviet Union,
wanted the property right to reflect different economic
Ultimately, as is the case with many
systems. 112
107. Id.
108. Yu, supra note 55, at 732 (“Despite this modern-day tendency to
consider intellectual property as private property, the international or regional
human rights instruments neither endorse nor reject the use of property right
to protect interests in intellectual creations.”).
109. HELFER & AUSTIN, supra note 21, at 62.
110. See Annheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Portugal, App. No. 73049/01, 45 Eur. H.R.
Rep. 36 (Grand Chamber 2007).
111. Yu, supra note 55, at 733.
112. MARY ANN GLENDON, A WORLD MADE NEW: ELEANOR ROOSEVELT AND
THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 182 (Random House 2001)
(“Article 17 on property rights occasioned much debate. The United States
strongly supported a right to own private property and to be protected against
public taking of private property without due safeguards.
The United
Kingdom’s Labour government representatives, however, took the position that
the article should be omitted, arguing that the regulation of property rights was
so extensive everywhere in the modern world that it made no sense to speak of a
right to ownership. Many Latin Americans took an entirely different tack: they
wanted the article to specify enough private property for a decent existence.
The Soviets, for their part, object to the idea that a decent existence should be
grounded in private property and insisted that the article should take account of
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international agreements, the language was left vague
enough to accommodate the views of different nations. 113
Neither the ICESCR nor the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) contain a provision on the
right to property. 114 This was primarily due to the fact that
the right to property was a politically sensitive issue between
capitalist and socialist countries. 115 However, the right to
property is recognized in a number of human rights
instruments, such as the American Declaration, 116 the
American Convention on Human Rights, 117 and the African
Charter on Human and People’s Rights. 118 The European
Convention on Human Rights 119 also recognizes the right to
private property, 120 including intellectual property for both
natural and legal persons. 121
TRIPS requires governments to compensate intellectual
property owners for compulsory licensing. 122 This provision
creates an obligation, not unlike provisions on takings or
expropriation of private property, to compensate the
intellectual property owner for use without permission.
Hence, even in the absence of express reference to property
interests per se, TRIPS appears to be consistent with an
the different economic systems in various countries.”).
113. Id. at 183.
114. See ICCPR, supra note 84.
115. Yu, supra note 55, at 733.
116. American Declaration, supra note 89, art. XXIII (“Every person has a
right to own such private property as meets the essential needs of decent living and
helps to maintain the dignity of the individual and of the home.”).
117. Signed at San José, Costa Rica, Nov. 22, 1969.
118. See African Charter on Human and People’s Rights art. 14, June 27,
1981, OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3 rev. 5, 21 I.L.M. 58 (1982) (“The right to
property shall be guaranteed. It may only be encroached upon in the interest of
public need or in the general interest of the community and in accordance with
the provisions of appropriate laws.”).
119. Rome, Italy, Nov. 4, 1950.
120. Protocol to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms art. 1, Paris, France, Mar., 20, 1952 (“Every natural or
legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No one
shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to
the conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of international
law.”).
121. See Annheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Portugal, App. No. 73049/01, 45 Eur. H.R.
Rep. 36 (Grand Chamber 2007).
122. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 8, art. 31(h) (“The right holder shall be
paid adequate remuneration in the circumstances of each case, taking into
account the economic value of the authorization.”).

2015]

CORPORATE “HUMAN RIGHTS”

23

understanding of intellectual property rights as property
interests of some kind.
The question is whether a human right to property leads
to a stronger property interest, or if the scope of any such
human right is narrower than a legal property interest.
Arguably, the interdependence and indivisibility of human
rights limits the right to property to the extent that it
interferes with other human rights. 123 Yet this limitation
generates additional complications. For instance, when does
the human right to intellectual property interfere with the
human right to health? Conversely, when does the human
right to health interfere with the human right to intellectual
property protection, and how would one balance these two
competing interests? Does the human rights framework offer
superior balancing tools to those available under the extant
intellectual property system? Arguably, if intellectual property
protection is not a human right, then the human right—as a
natural entitlement—should prevail. In addition, some human
rights instruments limit the right to property. For example,
the American Declaration limits the property right to that “as
meets the essential needs of decent living and helps to maintain
the dignity of the individual . . .” which suggests that one is
only entitled to as much property as one needs. 124 Certainly,
this kind of language would be useful in tempering any claim to
a very strong property interest. The UDHR does not contain
such language, but indicates that one can be deprived of one’s
property as long as this is not done “arbitrarily.”125
Moreover, in the current environment, it is doubtful that
courts and governments, or treaty negotiators and industry
associations that are looking to increase intellectual property
protections will encourage a human rights balancing.126 Since
patents, copyrights, and trademarks have already been
strengthened by the characterization as property127 and as
“trade-related,” the greatest risks from a human rights
framework pertain primarily to the framing of intellectual

123. Nickel, supra note 6, at 984–85.
124. American Declaration, supra note 89, art. XXIII.
125. UDHR, supra note 10, art. 17.
126. See TPP, supra note 49, and ACTA, supra note 49, as recent examples of
the upward ratchet.
127. See Carrier, supra note 79.
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property protection as a natural entitlement.128 The global
intellectual property system already favors intellectual
property producers and largely fails to take human rights
considerations into account.129 Treating intellectual property
protection as a human right may simply exacerbate this
problem. However, using human rights law to constrain
intellectual property could be an effective balancing strategy.
This is because, as discussed below, the lens through which
we view rights can impact their legal treatment.
III.

FRAMING: HUMAN RIGHTS & INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY

A. The Distinct Purposes of Intellectual Property and
Human Rights
Intellectual property law could benefit from some human
rights concepts. However, these two areas of law are distinct
in significant ways. The UDHR is the core international
instrument that sets out the generally recognized human
rights and freedoms. 130 Adopted by the United Nations
General Assembly after the establishment of the United
Nations following the Second World War, 131 the UDHR is not
a binding treaty, but rather a set of aspirational principles. 132
However, scholars have suggested that UDHR has been
incorporated into custom, as evidenced by various rules of
customary international law such as those relating to
torture. 133
While human rights law is based in international law,
there is a relationship with American values, even if the
United States does not apply international law in its domestic

128. But see Adam Mossoff, Saving Locke from Marx: The Labor Theory of
Value in Intellectual Property Theory, SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY & POLICY vol. 29, no.
2 (2012) (using Lockean natural rights theory to argue that intellectual property
rights are natural entitlements).
129. Margaret Chon, Intellectual Property “from Below”: Copyright and
Capability for Education, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 803, 805 (2007).
130. Donnelly, supra note 19, at 288 (“Virtually all states accept the
authority of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.”).
131. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights was adopted by General
Assembly resolution 217A at its third session in Paris on December 10, 1948.
UDHR, supra note 10.
132. See GLENDON, supra note 112, at 177.
133. See, e.g., Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 882 (2d Cir. 1990).
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courts. 134 In fact, the United States played an important role
in the development of the UDHR, with Eleanor Roosevelt
chairing the Drafting Committee. 135 In many respects, these
international human rights principles are the result of
American led efforts and philosophies. 136 The same is true for
the intellectual property rules that were implemented
through TRIPS.
Human rights law and enforceable
intellectual property standards were both developed through
international instruments that were influenced by American
philosophies.
The two areas of law have little else in common. The
nature of human rights is distinct from the nature of
intellectual property rights. Human rights are inalienable
rights enjoyed by all human beings. 137 They are, therefore,
also universal and indivisible. 138 As universal rights that can
be exercised by individuals against the state and society,
human rights are often viewed as a means to achieve social
Hence,
values that improve the human condition. 139
protecting human dignity is said to be the primary principle
underlying human rights laws. In addition, some human
rights scholars characterize the protection of the weak and

134. See Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111 (2d Cir. 2010).
135. United Nations, The Universal Declaration of Human Rights: History of
the
Document
(UDHR)
(Nov.
4,
2013),
available
at
http://www.un.org/en/documents/udhr/history.shtml).
136. GLENDON, supra note 112, at xviii (“ When read as it was meant to be,
namely as a whole, the Declarations’ vision of liberty is inseparable from it calls
to social responsibility (inspired in part by Franklin Roosevelt’s famous ‘four
freedoms’ —freedom of speech and belief, freedom from fear and from want). Its
organic unity was, however, one of the first casualties of the cold war.”).
137. Donnelly, supra note 19, at 283.
138. See, e.g., Vienna Declaration and Progamme of Action art. 5, World
Conference on Human Rights, Vienna, Austria, June 25, 1993, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.157/23 [hereinafter Vienna Declaration] (“All human rights are
universal, indivisible and interdependent and interrelated. The international
community must treat human rights globally in a fair and equal manner, on the
same footing, and with the same emphasis. While the significance of national
and regional particularities and various historical, cultural and religious
backgrounds must be borne in mind, it is the duty of States, regardless of their
political, economic and cultural systems, to promote and protect all human
rights and fundamental freedoms.”).
139. Donnelly, supra note 19, at 284 (“Human rights—equal and inalienable
entitlements of all individuals that may be exercised against the state and
society—are a distinctive way to seek to realize social values such as justice and
human flourishing.”).
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vulnerable as the goal of human rights law. 140 Intellectual
property laws, by comparison, are not designed to protect the
weak and vulnerable, but to stimulate innovation and
creativity. 141
The United Nations Committee on the ICESCR (the
“Committee”), distinguishes between human rights, which it
describes as “fundamental, inalienable[,] and universal
entitlements” and intellectual property rights that are
granted by states primarily to stimulate innovation and
There are a number of other differences
creativity. 142
between human rights and intellectual property rights. For
instance, unlike human rights, intellectual property rights
By
are time-limited, transferable, and revocable. 143
comparison, any human right to the protection of one’s
creative or inventive work could presumably continue
indefinitely.
Thus, framing intellectual property rights
through a human rights lens could lend support to claims to
perpetual rights that become difficult to challenge or deny.
The Committee also characterizes intellectual property
as protecting “business and corporate interests and
investments,” whereas the human right to the protection of
material and moral interests preserves the personal link
between the author and her creation and the author’s ability
to enjoy an adequate standard of living. 144 Clearly, however,
intellectual property law is not limited to protecting
140. Sally Engle Merry et al., Law From Below: Women’s Human Rights and
Social Movements in New York City, 44 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 101, 102 (2010)
(“Protecting the vulnerable and powerless is clearly fundamental to the
aspirations of human rights. The system of human rights law seeks to protect
the dignity and well-being of all humans, regardless of their citizenship, race,
gender, or class . . . . Human rights law promises the weakest and most
excluded people protections equal to those of the wealthy and the privileged.”).
141. General Comment No. 17, supra note 55; TRIPS Agreement, supra note
8, pmbl.; U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8; Megan M. Carpenter, Trademarks and
Human Rights: Oil and Water? Or Chocolate and Peanut Butter?, 99
TRADEMARK REP. 892, 901–02 (2009).
142. General Comment No. 17, supra note 55, ¶ 1.
143. Id. ¶ 2.
144. Id. (“Whereas the human right to benefit from the protection of the
moral and material interests resulting from one’s scientific, literary and artistic
productions safeguards the personal link between authors and their creations
and between peoples, communities, or other groups and their collective cultural
heritage, as well as their basic material interests which are necessary to enable
authors to enjoy an adequate standard of living, intellectual property regimes
primarily protect business and corporate interests and investments.”).
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businesses—it protects both natural and legal persons. 145
Indeed, some human rights protections, such as the right to
freedom of expression and the right to property, have been
extended to both natural and legal persons. Could the same
be true for a human right to intellectual property protection?
If so, it may be erroneous to assume that human rights law
will support a more balanced intellectual property system.
B. Human Rights Principles to Constrain or Promote?
The relationship between human rights and intellectual
property is not immediately obvious. Nonetheless, these two
seemingly distinct fields can intersect in at least two ways.
First, the “limiting approach” uses human rights to limit
intellectual property protections when they interfere with
other rights, like access to medicines or freedom of speech. 146
The human rights framework can also be used to contemplate
intellectual property protection as a human right. 147 This
Article focuses on the latter because this approach could
result in the use of human rights law to expand intellectual
property protections. 148
Some human rights scholars have advocated taking
human rights obligations into account in order to limit
intellectual property excesses. For instance, Molly Land
argues that governments should “limit the effects of
intellectual property rights in order to protect international
human rights.” 149 Peter Yu proposes the use of a human
rights framework for intellectual property on the basis that
145. Megan M. Carpenter, Intellectual property: A human (not corporate)
right, in FORGOTTEN RIGHTS, FORGOTTEN CONCEPTS 312, 312–13 (2012) (“The
temptation to categorize intellectual property rights as solely a vehicle for
protection of corporate interests is great . . . . And while corporate interests
dominate, as they do in other areas of human rights such as the food industry or
the health industry, it is crucial not to lose sight of the fundamental policies
behind intellectual property law, particularly the interests of the humans
behind human creativity.”).
146. An example would be the access to medicines movement. For instance,
although the Doha Declaration, supra note 43, does not explicitly reference
human rights law, it advocates a balancing between the public health and
intellectual property protection.
147. See Wong, supra note 18.
148. Helfer, supra note 82, at 1015–18.
149. Molly Beutz Land, Intellectual Property Rights and the Right to
Participate in Cultural Life at 1, INST FOR INFO. LAW & POLICY, White Paper
Series 08/09 No. 2 (2009).
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such a framework is “socially beneficial and that it will enable
the development of a balanced intellectual property
system.” 150 One of the early advocates of a human rights
approach to intellectual property, Audrey Chapman, suggests
that human rights would require that intellectual property
laws “facilitate and promote scientific progress and its
application and do so in a manner that will broadly benefit
members of society on an individual as well as collective
Laurence Helfer advocates a human rights
level.” 151
framework for intellectual property in which intellectual
property is employed as a tool to achieve human rights ends.
Under this framework, Helfer suggests that intellectual
property rules should be modified when they hinder human
rights outcomes. 152 These proposals are consistent with the
limiting approach and they are more likely to curtail, rather
than exacerbate, the potential excesses of intellectual
property law. These authors seem to be seeking a way for
intellectual property rules to work harmoniously with human
rights norms and possibly to have intellectual property law
help promote human rights objectives.
There is, however, another aspect to the human rights
and intellectual property discussion—one that could have an
effect contrary to the goal of achieving more balance in the
global intellectual property system.
The human rights
framework is not restricted to curtailing intellectual property
rights but also encompasses the notion of promoting a right to
intellectual property protection as a human right. Noting the
importance of intellectual property in the information
economy, Chapman argues that legal instruments and
decisions can have “significant ramifications” for the

150. Yu, supra note 7, at 1123.
151. Chapman, supra note 7.
152. Helfer, supra note 82, at 1018 (“A third human rights framework for
intellectual property . . . first specifies the minimum outcomes—in terms of
health, poverty, education, and so forth—that human rights law requires of
states. The framework next works backwards to identify different mechanisms
available to states to achieve those outcomes. Intellectual property plays only a
secondary role in this version of the framework. Where intellectual property
law helps to achieve human rights outcomes, governments should embrace it.
Where it hinders those outcomes, its rules should be modified . . . . But the focus
remains on the minimum level of human well-being that states must provide,
using either appropriate intellectual property rules or other means.”).
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protection of human rights. 153 She asserts, therefore, that it
is “important for the human rights community to claim the
rights of the author, creator and inventor, whether an
individual, a group or a community, as a human right.” 154
Peter Yu also discusses using a human rights framework to
protect creators’ material and moral interests while using
intellectual property rules to promote other human rights. 155
Similarly, Mary Wong, discussing copyright law, argues that
there is a human right to intellectual property protection that
encompasses both moral rights and property rights. 156
These scholars have made thoughtful arguments that are
appealing insofar as they describe the use of human rights
law primarily as a tool to empower human producers or users
of intellectual property protected goods. Using human rights
to ameliorate the potential deleterious effects of intellectual
property rights on human interests seems consistent with the
goal of achieving greater balance between protecting
intellectual property owners and promoting other societal
goals. However, characterizing intellectual property as a
human right has the potential to lead to undesirable
consequences.
Kal Raustiala, for instance, queries whether the
marriage of intellectual property and human rights will make
intellectual property rights “more socially just, or just more
Raustiala cautions that in the current
powerful.” 157
environment of ever increasing intellectual property
protections, 158 a human rights approach to intellectual
property could “entrench some dangerous ideas” about the
inviolable nature of property rights as human rights. 159 If one
153. Chapman, supra note 12, at 308.
154. Id.
155. Yu, supra note 7, at 1149 (“The successful development of a human
rights framework for intellectual property not only will offer individuals the
well-deserved protection of their moral and material interests in intellectual
creations, but also will allow states to harness the intellectual property system
to protect human dignity and respect as well as to promote the full realization of
other important human rights.”).
156. Wong, supra note 18.
157. Raustiala, supra note 38, at 1023.
158. Id. at 1034 (“Traditional knowledge is hardly the only area in which new
international-protected IP rights have been proposed: there are efforts
underway today to negotiate new international rules on broadcast rights,
audiovisual performances, and patents, as well as . . . geographic indications.”).
159. Id. at 1023.
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cannot violate such rights, the effect will be to further
strengthen intellectual property rights, rather than weaken
them. 160 Raustiala refers to the efforts to protect indigenous
traditional knowledge 161 as an example of the dangerous
proliferation of intellectual property rights. 162 Although
seemingly sympathetic to the plight of indigenous peoples, he
cautions that new international property rules are not the
solution. 163
Robert Ostergard criticizes the concept of intellectual
property rights as human rights because they may conflict
with other human rights that should be prioritized. 164 He
further objects to promoting human rights to intellectual
property because it would allow intellectual property
producers to promote their interests while ignoring national
development objectives. 165 In my view, the case against a
human right to intellectual property protection becomes even
stronger if multinational corporations can utilize the
framework to their benefit.
C. The Risks of Promoting a Human Right to Intellectual

160. Id. at 1032 (“ Just as the popularization of the term ‘intellectual
property’ probably helped raise the salience of the underlying rights of patent,
copyright, trademark, and the like—and likely enhanced political support for
government intervention to protect these rights by tapping into the strong
respect for property rights present in many parts of the world—the introduction
of human rights language to the policy debate over IP may have a similar
strengthening influence.”).
161. The World Intellectual Property Organization defines traditional
knowledge as follows: “Traditional knowledge (TK) is knowledge, know-how,
skills and practices that are developed, sustained and passed on from
generation to generation within a community, often forming part of its cultural
or spiritual identity.” WIPO, supra note 45. For example, traditional
knowledge includes Yoga and traditional medicinal knowledge.
162. Raustiala, supra note 38, at 1032.
163. Id.
164. Ostergard Jr., supra note 77, at 175–76 (“The declaration of IP as a
universal human right is problematic within the framework of physical wellbeing established in this article because the UN position does not recognize the
hierarchy of IP that exists. Under the Universal Declaration, the registered
trademark for a multinational corporation is accorded the same importance and
protection as a patent for medicinal purposes.”).
165. Id. at 175 (“By promoting IP as a guaranteed right, the [Universal]
Declaration gives IP producers significant latitude in abrogating any
responsibility to promote national development, though producers often argue
for greater access to foreign markets and the protection of IP in those
markets.”).
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Property
Adopting human rights principles is not a purely
theoretical consideration. This framework can have practical
implications for intellectual property law. 166 The approach
taken to intellectual property, whether trade-based or human
rights-oriented, and the terminology used with respect to
intellectual property rights can shift our understanding of the
nature of the rights. 167 The way we frame global discussions
about intellectual property can, therefore, influence our
understanding of intellectual property rights, perhaps even
more than the language of specific legislative instruments. 168
In addition to being comprised of a set of laws, human
rights law has been described as encompassing a set of
values, whose “core ideas are human dignity, equality,
nondiscrimination, protection of bodily integrity from state
violence as well as other forms of violence, and
freedom . . . .” 169 These values, derived from the European
Enlightenment and the American Revolution, are generally
believed to represent the consensus of the international
community. 170 Thus, as a set of values and beliefs, a human
166. Raustiala, supra note 38, at 1036 (“While well-intentioned, human
rights rhetoric may aid, rather than hinder, the efforts at enclosure and in the
process exacerbate an already troubling erosion of the public domain. This is
not to imply that there is little that is positive in the expanding marriage of
human rights and IP. As noted above, there are significant efforts to use
human rights instruments and concepts to roll back some of the more egregious
elements of TRIPS.”).
167. Id. at 1032 (“ Just as the popularization of the term ‘intellectual
property’ probably helped raise the salience of the underlying rights of patent,
copyright, trademark, and the like—and likely enhanced political support for
government intervention to protect these rights by tapping into the strong
respect for property rights present in many parts of the world—the introduction
of human rights language to the policy debate over IP may have a similar
strengthening influence.”); SELL, supra note 47, at 5 (“The way that issues are
framed can make a great deal of difference in terms of what is and what is not
considered legitimate.”).
168. Raustiala, supra note 38, at 1037 (“More significant than any specific
agreement or text are the possible political effects of incorporating the human
rights paradigm into IP law . . . . [T]he risk is that the language and politics of
human rights, as it filters into the language and politics of IP rights, will make
it harder for governments to resist the sirens songs of those seeking ever more
powerful legal entitlements.”).
169. Merry et al., supra note 140, at 107.
170. Id. (“ Although these values are widespread, a central aspect of the
human rights system is the way its legal apparatus legitimates its core
principles by claiming that they represent the consensus of the ‘international
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rights approach is not strictly a matter applying pertinent
human rights laws. Intellectual property norms can be
informed by human rights values, even in the absence of
controlling law. 171
Merging intellectual property and international trade has
altered our understanding and characterization of intellectual
property at a global level. 172 In addition, scholars observe
that the “propertization” of patent, copyright, and trademark
has changed not only the narrative, but also the legal
As Michael Carrier
treatment of intangible rights. 173
explains, the “propertization” of intellectual property has
been part of the trend towards making intellectual property
rights stronger. 174 Liam O’Melinn decries the framing of
copyright and patents as property as an attempt at “a subtle
but decisive shift in the purpose of intellectual property law
in the direction of purely private entitlement and away from
any public benefit.” 175 In this way, characterizing intellectual
property rights as property is consistent with the trend
towards increased intellectual property protection. 176 The
discussion of patents, copyrights and trademarks as property
has shaped our understanding of intellectual property rights
and, as some scholars have observed, it has affected the
nature of the rights by making them stronger. Intellectual
community.’ This value system grows out of a long history of human rights
advocacy dating from the European Enlightenment, and the articulation of its
values in the French Revolution, the American Revolution, the anti-slavery
movement and many others.”).
171. For instance, the access to medicines movement, which can be supported
on the basis of the right to health that is articulated in Article 25 of the UDHR,
is an example of using human rights principles to impact intellectual property
law. UDHR, supra note 10, art. 25. The Doha Declaration on TRIPS and Public
Health is a concrete result of the efforts to address some of the negative effects
of intellectual property rights on access to medicines.
172. I have argued this point more fully elsewhere. See Osei-Tutu, supra
note 28.
173. Carrier, supra note 79, at 5 (“The propertization of IP is in fact
unfortunate. But it also appears to be irreversible.”); Liam Séamus O’Melinn,
Software and Shovels: How the Intellectual Property Revolution is Undermining
Traditional Concepts of Property, 76 U. CIN. L. REV. 143, 144 (2007).
174. Carrier, supra note 79, at 10 (“In continually strengthening IP, courts
have characterized it as a type of property.”).
175. O’Melinn, supra note 173, at 144.
176. The “upward ratchet,” as it has been described, is apparent in
agreements like the TRIPS Agreement, supra note 8, ACTA, supra note 49,
TPP, supra note 49, the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304,
112 Stat. 2860 (1998), and copyright term extension, to name a few examples.
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property rights are explicitly recognized in the TRIPS
Agreement as private rights 177 and they are now generally
recognized as property rights, 178 despite some suggestions
that they would be more appropriately characterized as
privileges. 179
The characterization of copyrights, patents, and other
intangible rights as human rights may further hinder the
ability of governments to limit such rights where they
interfere with competing social and policy goals. A human
right to intellectual property protection drives intellectual
property law further towards the language of rights rather
than the more limiting language of privileges. 180 It also
promotes a natural rights approach to intellectual property
law rather than a utilitarian one. 181
The utilitarian approach views intellectual property as a
tool to achieve a certain end, rather than an inherent right. 182
The advantage of the utilitarian conception of intellectual
property law is that the entitlement can be interpreted in
light of the objectives of the law, and not on some asserted
natural right of the intellectual property owner. Consistent
with the utilitarian approach to intellectual property, 183 the
goals of patent and copyright law in the United States are
regularly interpreted in light of the stated Constitutional
objective: “to promote the progress of science and the useful

177. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 8, pmbl. (recognizing that “intellectual
property rights are private rights . . . .”).
178. Wong, supra note 18, at 777 (“ We generally accept that the legal rights
associated with intellectual property (‘IP’ ) are those that flow from the fact that
it is property and can be owned, thereby importing fundamental concepts of
property law, such as excludability and alienability, into IP law.”).
179. PETER DRAHOS, A PHILOSOPHY OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 5 (Ashgate
1996).
180. Shaver, supra note 7.
181. See Donnelly, supra note 19, at 286 (“Natural or human rights ideas
first developed in the modern West. A full-fledged natural rights theory is
evident in John Locke’s Second Treaties of Government, published in 1689 in
support of the so-called Glorious Revolution. The American and French
Revolutions first used such ideas to construct new political orders.”).
182. DRAHOS, supra note 179, at 5.
183. Adam D. Moore, Intellectual Property, Innovation, and Social Progress:
The Case Against Incentive Based Arguments, 26 HAMLINE L. REV. 601, 606
(2003) (“Beginning with the first Patent Act of 1790 and continuing through the
adoption of the Berne Convention Standards in 1989, the basis given for AngloAmerican systems of intellectual property has been utilitarian in nature, and
not grounded in the natural rights of the author or inventor.”).
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arts.” 184
Like the “propertization” of intellectual property, a
natural rights conception of intellectual property will have
the tendency to lead to greater protection of the
entitlement. 185 This is because such discussion centers less
on the question of whether the laws are promoting “progress”
and more on the asserted natural right of the creator to this
legal protection—either based on labor theory or the natural
extension of the person theory. 186 In the context of a natural
rights approach, one can argue more effectively to restrict the
ability of the state to limit such rights, regardless of whether
the goal of promoting progress is being achieved or impeded.
Similarly, contemplating intellectual property through a
human rights lens can alter the way we understand,
characterize, and develop intellectual property at a global
level.
Prioritizing human rights, like freedom of
expression, 187 or less widely accepted rights like the right to
food, 188 over state-granted intellectual property rights shifts
the balance in favor of access instead of protection. By
contrast, treating intellectual property protection as a human
right could make it more difficult to place limitations on
intellectual property rights. 189
Of course, human rights law permits, under certain
circumstances, the imposition of limits, albeit only to the
extent that may reasonably be necessary, and often for a
limited period of time. 190 The concept of indivisibility of
human rights—that all human rights are interdependent and
that all rights must be respected—naturally imports some
balance into a human rights system because there is no

184. U.S, CONST. art. I, § 8.
185. See Carrier, supra note 79, at 10.
186. See ROBERT P. MERGES, JUSTIFYING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 4–9
(Harvard Univ. Press 2011).
187. UDHR, supra note 10; ICCPR, supra note 84.
188. UDHR, supra note 10; ICESCR, supra note 83.
189. HELFER & AUSTIN, supra note 21, at 514. The Supreme Court has
clearly stated that the public domain is not inviolable. See Golan v Holder, 132
S. Ct. (2012) 873, 891 (“However spun, these contentions depend on an
argument we considered and rejected above, namely that the Constitution
renders the public domain largely untouchable by Congress.”).
190. See ICCPR, supra note 84, Art. 4; Hafner-Burton et. al, Emergency and
Escape: Explaining Derogations From Human Rights Treaties, 65
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION, 673, 676 (2011).
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hierarchy of rights. 191 However, as intellectual property and
human rights serve fundamentally different purposes, the
balance that is struck under intellectual property law may be
distinct from that which is reached under human rights law.
Thus, under the human rights framework for intellectual
property, there may be times when intellectual property law
performs the balancing function and times when human
rights laws would provide the necessary guidance.
In balancing the interests of an intellectual property
owner against the human right to health, for instance, the
balancing of interests should favor the human right to health.
For instance, access to medicines, formulated as part of the
right to health under Article 25 of the UDHR, could be
prioritized over the twenty-year patent term. Prioritizing
human rights can be attributed to the goal of protecting
human dignity as well as the state’s ability to limit rights
that are granted as a concession of the state. Under this
analysis, fundamental human rights trump limited stategranted rights. In the context of international law, it could be
argued, at least theoretically, that intellectual property rights
should not interfere with inviolable human rights. However,
if the patent right is characterized as a human right, it
becomes less clear that other human rights, such as the right
to health, should be prioritized. A human right to patent
protection would be an inviolable right and therefore, at least
conceptually, stronger than the twenty-year limited patent
right that is currently available in all WTO member states.
Some of the concerns about strengthening intellectual
property rights may be alleviated by concluding that
corporations cannot claim that they have a human right to
intellectual property protection. 192 Some scholars and human
rights experts see the framework as excluding corporations. 193
If the human rights aspects extend only to natural persons,
191. Vienna Declaration, supra note 138, ¶ 5 (“All human rights are
universal, indivisible and interdependent and interrelated. The international
community must treat human rights globally in a fair and equal manner, on the
same footing, and with the same emphasis. While the significance of national
and regional particularities and various historical, cultural and religious
backgrounds must be borne in mind, it is the duty of States, regardless of their
political, economic and cultural systems, to promote and protect all human
rights and fundamental freedoms.”); Nickel, supra note 6, at 984–85.
192. Yu, supra note 55, at 728.
193. Chapman, supra note 7; Yu, supra note 7.
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and not to legal persons, then the potential for expansion of
intellectual property rights seems less significant.
Individuals would be able to assert their rights against
corporations that own the intellectual property but the
reverse would not hold true. 194 However, corporations have
not been completely precluded from using human rights law
It is
to protect their intellectual property interests. 195
reasonable to anticipate that, given the opportunity,
corporations would utilize human rights laws or principles to
support their intellectual property claims.
In his analysis of the human right to intellectual
property, Peter Yu responds to three areas of critique. 196 The
first is that the elevation of intellectual property to the status
of human rights is undesirable; the second is the risk of
institutional capture by powerful rights holders; and the third
is that the human rights framework is a Western concept that
is not necessarily well suited to non-Western countries.197
This Article focuses on the first two challenges that Yu
identified. However, rather than accepting that corporations
are naturally excluded from the framework, this Article
considers the possibility of corporate claims to intellectual
property protection based on human rights principles.
How corporations fit into the human rights framework
for intellectual property is partially determined by differing
theoretical approaches to corporations. As our conception of
the corporation evolves, so does the corporation’s ability to
assert its rights. Thus, any human rights approach to
intellectual property must take into consideration the
potential for legal persons to use human rights law to frame
their claims.
IV.

CORPORATIONS AND THE HUMAN RIGHTS
FRAMEWORK

The question of corporations asserting rights based on
human rights laws or principles is more complex than it may
194. Yu, supra note 7, at 1128–1131 (arguing that corporate intellectual
property rights would have no human rights basis and therefore cannot rise to
the level of human rights).
195. See generally Annheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Portugal, App. No. 73049/01, 45
Eur. H.R. Rep. 36 (Grand Chamber 2007).
196. Yu, supra note 7, at 1124.
197. Id.
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initially appear. In response to skepticism about the utility of
human rights for intellectual property law, some scholars who
support the use of a human rights framework for intellectual
property dismiss the possibility that corporations could claim
a human right to intellectual property protection. 198 As
Chapman writes with respect to patents and copyrights, “a
strong case can be made that a human rights approach
requires that individuals, but not legal entities like
corporations, be accorded the moral and material benefits”
under Article 15 of the ICESCR. 199 After all, human rights
are for human beings and not for artificial persons that were
created by law. 200 In addition, human rights law may be seen
as way to protect the weak and the vulnerable, rather than
corporations that may have more wealth and power than
However, some human rights are
some countries. 201
enshrined as fundamental rights in domestic constitutions
and extended to legal persons.
As Laurence Helfer and Graeme Austin observe in their
treatise on intellectual property and human rights:
Protecting the intellectual property of corporations under
the rubric of fundamental rights may strike many
observers as fundamentally misguided. But the text and
drafting history of several human rights treaties reveal a
desire to protect the possessory interests of both
businesses and natural persons. In particular . . . the rule
of law in general and the stability and predictability of
property rights would be undermined if governments
could arbitrarily deprive any class of owners of their
possessions . . . . 202

While recognizing that governments may limit property
198. See Chapman, supra note 12, at 316; Yu, supra note 55, at 728–30;
General Comment No. 17, supra note 55, ¶ 4.
199. Chapman, supra note 12, at 317.
200. Id. at 316 (“By its very nature, a human right is vested in individuals,
and in a few instances a community, but never in an economic corporation. Nor
is there a basis in human rights to justify using intellectual property
instruments as a means to protect economic investments.”).
201. Merry et al., supra note 140, at 102 (“Protecting the vulnerable and
powerless is clearly fundamental to the aspirations of human rights. The
system of human rights law seeks to protect the dignity and well-being of all
humans, regardless of their citizenship, race, gender, or class . . . . Human
rights law promises the weakest and most excluded people protections equal to
those of the wealthy and the privileged.”).
202. HELFER & AUSTIN, supra note 21, at 62.
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interests in favor of particular social and economic objectives,
Helfer and Austin do not characterize a human right to
intellectual property as excluding legal persons. 203
The extension of human rights laws to corporations
applies only to some human rights. If there is a rational basis
for protecting corporate property rights in the context of a
human rights framework, then arguably this can include
patents, copyrights and trademarks as well. Moreover, it has
been suggested that in light of the efforts to hold
transnational corporations accountable for violations of
international human rights law, legal persons should be
recognized as having rights under the law. 204 It would be
inaccurate to characterize legal persons as being entitled to
human rights as a general claim. Nonetheless, if the goal of
the human rights framework for intellectual property is to
improve human outcomes in areas like health, food, and
access to knowledge, then corporate claims must be
considered. The potential for legal persons to successfully
expand intellectual property protections by framing their
claims using human rights concepts is pertinent to the
ultimate utility of the framework. Corporate human rightsbased claims are not without support in theory and existing
jurisprudence.
As previously noted, the European Convention on Human
Rights recognizes that corporations can assert human rights
protection for their intellectual property. 205 There is no
equivalent regime in the United States. However, the United
States Supreme Court decision in Citizens United v. Federal
Election Commission, while not directly applicable to the
intellectual property and human rights framework, provides a
useful analytical lens. 206 In this case, the Supreme Court
203. Id.
204. Lucien J. Dhooge, Human Rights for Transnational Corporations, 16 J.
TRANSNAT’L L. & POL’Y 197, 200 (2007) (“This article posits that transnational
corporations possess legal personality sufficient to be granted rights in a
manner similar to those granted to human beings in modern human rights law.
In recognizing such status, the article contends that transnational are rightscarrying persons in addition to being duty-bearing entities.”).
205. See Annheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Portugal, App. No. 73049/01, 45 Eur. H.R.
Rep. 36 (Grand Chamber 2007).
206. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010), 130 Sup.
Ct. 876 (concluding that a “prohibition on corporate independent expenditure is
an outright ban on speech.”). Id. at 882 (declining to limit the free speech rights
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considered corporate claims regarding the right to free
speech, which is both a constitutional right 207 and an
international human right. 208 Noting that corporate speech
has long been protected in the United States, 209 the Court
concluded that the political speech of corporations is also
The Court rejected the argument that
protected. 210
corporations’ political speech should not be protected because
they are not natural persons. 211 The Court also grappled with
the exercise of corporate rights in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby. 212
It is true that such cases have no precedential value in
the intellectual property and human rights context. 213
Indeed, the international human rights framework is not
directly applicable in the United States, 214 and American law
does not directly impact international human rights law.
Nonetheless, the principles that guided the Citizens United
decision are helpful in discussing human rights and
fundamental rights in relation to corporations. In particular,
if the basis for distinguishing between legal and natural
persons, or between different kinds of legal persons, is
rejected by courts or other actors, the assertion that a human
right to intellectual property cannot include corporate
persons may need to be more adequately supported.
of non-media corporations).
207. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
208. The Universal Declaration on Human Rights, Article 18, states,
“[e]veryone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this
right includes freedom to change his religion or belief, and freedom, either alone
or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or
belief in teaching, practice, worship and observance.” UDHR, supra note 10,
art. 18.
209. Citizens United, 558 U.S. 310, 130 Sup. Ct. 876 at 883 (“The Court has
recognized that First Amendment Protection applies to corporations.”). Id.
210. Id. at 900 (“The Court has thus rejected the argument that.”). Id.
211. Id.
212. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2775–83 (2104).
In this case, the Supreme Court held 5-4 that the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act prohibition on the government substantially burdening a
“ person’s ” free exercise of religion includes corporate persons. Id.
213. First, the rights in question are different; second, a U.S. constitutional
law decision does not set a legal precedent for the interpretation of international
human rights obligations. Nonetheless, the principles from the case are
consistent with a trend towards the increased protection of corporate interests,
both in Europe and the United States.
214. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111 (2d Cir. 2010); Merry
et al., supra note 140, at 103 (“Historically, human rights were meant for
export, not for domestic consumption.”).
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An analytic approach that refuses to distinguish natural
persons from legal persons could be applied to other
fundamental rights that are enjoyed by both natural persons
and corporations. This includes intellectual property claims
that are based on human rights law or principles. Given that
both legal and natural persons own patents, trademarks, and
copyrights, is it possible that emphasizing the human rights
aspects of intellectual property could end up primarily
benefitting corporations? 215 Ultimately, even commentators
who argue that corporations cannot claim human rights per
se acknowledge that corporations could, through national law,
assert rights that are based on human rights law. 216
Importantly, the human rights framework, should it
become widely accepted, could have a significant impact in
nations that incorporate international human rights
principles when interpreting their domestic laws. 217 Indeed,
many countries attempt to interpret their domestic laws as
consistent
with
their
international
obligations. 218
Furthermore, to the extent that a human rights lens becomes
part of the intellectual property dialogue, we must
215. Helfer, supra note 82, at 1015 (“In this vision of the future . . . industries
and interest groups that rely upon intellectual property for their economic wellbeing would invoke the authors’ rights provisions and property rights provisions
in human rights treaties to further augment existing standards of
protection . . . . Early intimations of this version of the framework’s future are
already apparent.”).
216. Yu, supra note 7, at 1130 (“ To be certain, even though the protection of
human rights is limited to individuals, countries are free to extend through
national legislations ‘human-rights’ like protection to corporations or other
collective entities.”).
217. Michael Kirby, J., The Role of International Standards in Australian
Courts, in INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONTEXT 704, 705 (Steiner &
Alston eds. 2000) (“The traditional view of most common law countries has been
that international law is not part of domestic law . . . . More recently, however,
a new recognition has come about of the use that may be made by judges of
international human rights principles and their exposition by the courts,
tribunals, and other bodies established to give them content and effect. This
reflects both the growing body of international human rights law and the
instruments, both regional and international, which give effect to that law.”).
218. Jorg Polakiewicz, The Application of the European Convention on
Human Rights in Domestic Law, in INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN
CONTEXT 1001, 1003 (Steiner & Alston eds. 2000) (“It is common practice in
many countries that the courts give statutes, wherever possible, an
interpretation which is in line with the Convention. National courts are indeed
required to ensure that international responsibility of their country arising from
wrongful application of or disrespect for rules of public international law be
avoided.”).
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contemplate interpretations
of
intellectual
property
obligations not only under domestic law, but also within the
context of TRIPS. 219
The intellectual property standards in the TRIPS
Agreement were shaped by the interests of intellectual
property producing industries and their representative
organizations. 220 A handful of powerful corporations are
credited with the standardized approach to intellectual
property rights that are reflected in the TRIPS Agreement.221
The trend towards greater intellectual property protection is
evident from the various bilateral agreements 222 as well as
negotiations on multilateral agreements like the TransPacific Partnership Agreement. 223 We should expect this
upward trend to continue. 224 Thus, even if the ultimate goal
is to limit the ability of corporations to benefit from a human
rights framework for intellectual property, this can be best
achieved by first acknowledging the potential for corporations
to appropriate a human rights lens for their own benefit.
This analysis will depend, to some extent, on how we
understand the corporation.
A. Who is the Corporation?
This Article does not attempt to engage in a
comprehensive analysis of corporations and their role in
society. However, in contemplating whether a corporation
can claim human rights to its intellectual property, one must
219. The relationship between the TRIPS Agreement and other international
agreements that reference intellectual property rights raises a number of
interesting questions that go beyond the scope of this paper.
220. STIGLITZ, supra note 25, at 116; SELL, supra note 47, at 96–97.
221. SELL, supra note 47, at 96 (“In effect, twelve corporations made public
law for the world.”).
222. See http://www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements for a
list of bilateral trade agreements. Many of these have provisions aimed at
ensuring strong intellectual property protections.
223. See Office of the United States Trade Representative, Trans-Pacific
Partnership:
Summary
of
U.S.
Objectives,
available
at
http://www.ustr.gov/tpp/Summary-of-US-objectives.
224. James M. Buchanan, Toward Analysis of Closed Behavioral Systems, in
THEORY OF PUBLIC CHOICE: POLITICAL APPLICATIONS OF ECONOMICS 11, 16–17
(Buchanan & Tollison eds. 1972) (“ The economic model of behavior is based on
the motivational postulate of individual utility maximization . . . . The actors
who behave ‘economically’ choose ‘more rather than less’ with more and less
being identified in units of goods that are independently identified and defined.
This becomes a prediction about behavior in the real world.”).

42

SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW

[Vol: 55

give some consideration to the question: who is the
corporation?
There are two predominant theoretical articulations of
the corporation. 225 First, the concession theory postulates
that corporations are created by the state and have only the
rights that are granted to them by the state. 226 Thus, under
the concession theory it is acceptable for the government to
restrict the activities of corporations. 227 The second theory is
the aggregate or contractual theory, which treats corporations
as a collective of individuals who have come together under
the form of the corporation. 228 Under this theory, the
corporation is seen as based on private contracts between
individuals. 229 These individuals do not lose the rights they
would enjoy as individuals merely because they came
together to form a legal entity. 230 Other theorists describe the
corporation as a kind of “super person” that has received
extensive protection from the law. 231 According to the real
entity theory of the corporation, the corporation is viewed as
having an existence of its own, one that is distinct from its
shareholders and that is not controlled by the state. If
corporations are viewed in this light, they are more easily
characterized as having natural rights. 232
The currently prevailing theory of corporate personality

225. Liam Séamus O’Melinn, Neither Contract nor Concession: The Public
Personality of the Corporation, 74 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 201, 201 (2006)
(“Theorists continue to hold that the corporation is the product of either a
concession or a contract.”).
226. Elizabeth Pollman, Reconceiving Corporate Personhood, 2011 UTAH L.
REV. 1629, 1635 (“Under this view, the corporation is a legal fiction and
incorporation a special privilege or concession awarded by the state.”).
227. O’ Melinn, supra note 225, at 201.
228. Pollman, supra note 226, at 1641 (“The theory had roots in a view of the
corporation as a partnership or contract among the shareholders.”).
229. David Millon, Theories of the Corporation, 1990 DUKE L.J. 201, 203 (“ In
its most recent incarnation, the private aggregation idea has assumed the garb
of neoclassical economics under the ‘corporation as a nexus of contracts’ rubric.
Advocates of this theory have used the freedom-of-contract metaphor to support
their shareholder primacy, anti-regulatory policy objectives.”).
230. Pollman, supra note 226, at 1641–42.
231. O’ Melinn, supra note 225, at 201 (“This Article challenges the two
preeminent theories of the corporation—contract and concession—by arguing
that the corporation is a special kind of moral personality for which the law has
made extensive accommodation.”).
232. Pollman, supra note 226, at 1642 (“ This view of the corporations as ‘real’
and ‘natural’ suggested inherent, inviolable rights.”).
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in the United States is the contract or aggregate theory. 233 If
one analyzes corporate rights based on the aggregate theory
of the corporation, there will be a tendency to equate the
rights of the legal person with those of the natural person
unless the right is one which is clearly not applicable to a
legal person—like the right to be free from torture. To an
even greater extent than the contract or aggregate theory of
the corporation, treatment of the corporation as some kind of
natural super person lends itself to the conclusion that the
corporation should have the same rights as a natural
person. 234 As one scholar writes, the corporation “is far better
viewed as an immortal being with a soul, its existence and its
entitlements based neither on sovereign grace nor on
contracts entered into by rugged individuals, but on a moral
personality distinct from that of both the individual and the
state.” 235
Clearly, the concession theory provides the strongest
basis for the state to limit the role of the corporation. 236
Under the concession theory, which is no longer prevalent,
one could more confidently assert that corporations are
naturally excluded from a human rights framework.
However, if the law indeed treats the corporation as an
aggregate of individuals, who do not lose their rights by
virtue of being a collective, or as a “super person,” then any
assumption that corporations will be frustrated in their
efforts to claim human rights to their intellectual property is
flawed.
Another consideration that is pertinent to the human
rights discussion is the nature of the corporation.
233. O’Melinn, supra note 225, at 203 (“In recent years, the contractual view
has become increasingly dominant, and although the concession theorists have
provided continuous resistance, the contractual theory has nonetheless defined
the terms of the discussion.”).
234. Id. (“The modern corporation is a social force and legal person without
peer, an exceptional person treated unlike other persons before the law. The
corporation has truly become a new kind of juristic person, defying the
traditional categories of law and occupying a privileged place akin to that of an
aristocracy.”).
235. Id.
236. Pollman, supra note 226, at 1635 (“Under this view, the corporation is a
legal fiction and incorporation a special privilege awarded by the state.
Accordingly, this view supported the government-imposed limitations on
corporations of the time because if incorporation is a state grant, it follows that
it can be a limited one.”).
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Corporations can be private business corporations, or they
may be municipal corporations or public not-for profit entities
like churches and universities. 237 Should it matter whether
the corporation is a large for-profit entity like the Monsanto
Company, 238 or an indigenous group that wants to protect its
traditional knowledge?
Monsanto, for example, is a multinational corporation. It
is also a corporation that has outraged many due to its
aggressive stance on its intellectual property, genetically
modified organisms and its treatment of farmers. 239 For
instance, the film Food, Inc. 240 was highly critical of Monsanto
and other large food companies.
The Food, Inc. film
generated sufficient consumer reaction that Monsanto has
attempted to respond to consumer criticisms, including
concerns about its aggressive enforcement of its patents. 241
Critics of transnational corporations, like Monsanto, may be
highly uncomfortable with the prospect of these companies
using human rights law to argue for stronger patent rights.
By comparison, the Seminole Tribe 242 of Florida is a federally
recognized American Indian tribe with a proud history and
culture. 243 It may even have culture and traditions that it
would like to have protected as traditional knowledge. 244
237. O’ Melinn, supra note 225, at 205.
238. Monsanto is a Delaware corporation, with global offices. See Monsanto
Co., Restated Certificate of Incorporation of Monsanto Company (2013),
available
at
http://www.monsanto.com/whoweare/Pages/certificate-ofincorporation.aspx.
239. See Organic Consumers Association, Millions Against Monsanto,
http://www.organicconsumers.org/monsanto/.
240. See Public Broadcasting Service, Food, Inc., A Robert Kenner Film: Film
Description
(Apr.
21,
2010),
http://www.pbs.org/pov/foodinc/film_description.php.
241. Monsanto Co., Food, Inc. Movie, http://www.monsanto.com/foodinc/Pages/default.aspx.
242. Seminole Tribe of Florida, Government – How we operate,
http://www.semtribe.com/Government/BoardofDirectors.aspx (“ The Seminole
Tribe of Florida, Inc., is a federal corporation. In the corporate charter, [t]he
Board of Director’s specific purpose is stated, ‘To further the economic
development of the Seminole Tribe of Florida by conferring upon said Tribe
certain corporate rights, powers, privileges and immunity; to secure for the
members of the Tribe an assured economic independence; and to provide for the
proper exercise by the Tribe of various functions heretofore performed by the
Department of Interior.’ ”).
243. Seminole Tribe of Florida, The Seminole Tribe of Florida,
http://www.semtribe.com/.
244. The World Intellectual Property Organization defines traditional
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Advocates of the human rights framework for intellectual
property also tend to be supportive of a collective right to
One might argue that since
traditional knowledge. 245
traditional knowledge holders tend to be groups, their claims
will be similar to those of the legal person from the
perspective of aggregate theory. Indeed, as is the case of the
Seminole Tribe, some of these indigenous groups may be
legally incorporated persons. Not only is the Seminole Tribe
a federal corporation, it is a wealthy corporation, 246 and the
owner of the Hard Rock Café. 247 This is but one example of
the complexity of the arguments and the potential actors who
might seek to benefit from a human right to intellectual
property protection.
Overall, the right to moral interests is not easily
extendable to corporations if these rights are analyzed
pursuant to a natural rights approach to intangible creations
and in line with the view that the creativity is an expression
of the human self. 248 It is also initially difficult to envision
how the material or moral interests of the creator could be
knowledge as follows: “Traditional knowledge (TK) is knowledge, know-how,
skills and practices that are developed, sustained and passed on from
generation to generation within a community, often forming part of its cultural
or spiritual identity.” WIPO, supra note 45.
245. Chapman, supra note 12; Helfer, supra note 82.
246. Dara Kam, State cashing in on extra $4.3 million of Seminole gambling
money, NEWS SERV. OF FLORIDA (Oct. 22, 2013), available at
http://www.naplesnews.com/news/2013/oct/22/state-cashing-in-on-extra-43million-of-seminole/ (“With the expiration of a gambling deal with the Seminole
Indians on the horizon, the tribe for the first time has raked in so much money
that it sent an extra $4.3 million to the state.”).
247. See Hard Rock Café International, Inc., Seminole Ownership,
http://www.hardrock.com/corporate/ownership.aspx (“In 2004, the Seminole
Tribe opened two Seminole Hard Rock Hotels and Casinos in Florida. With the
March 2007 acquisition of the Hard Rock brand, the Seminole Tribe of Florida
added the prestige of one of the world’s most respected brands.”). The deal
excluded the Hard Rock Las Vegas casino as well as the one in London,
England, and rights to Hard Rock intellectual property in Brazil, Australia,
Israel, Venezuela and much of the Western United States. See NBC News,
Seminole Tribe buys Hard Rock café business (Dec. 8, 2006), available at
http://www.nbcnews.com/id/16090321/ns/business-world_business/t/seminoletribe-buys-hard-rock-cafe-business/#.VGbogvnF-Ck.
248. General Comment No. 17, supra note 55, ¶ 12 (“ The protection of the
‘moral interests’ of authors was one of the main concerns of the drafters of
article 27, paragraph 2, of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights . . . .
Their intention was to proclaim the intrinsically personal character of every
creation of the human mind and the ensuing durable link between creators and
their creations.”).
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considered applicable to anyone other than a natural person,
particularly since only a natural person can be a creator. Yet,
a group of persons could be considered the “creator.” 249 In the
dialogue regarding protection for traditional knowledge, it is
often asserted that traditional knowledge innovation is
generated by a group, rather than an individual. 250
Presumably, if the human right is recognized as a collective
right as well as an individual right, the right to the protection
of moral and material interests should extend to the group. 251
This is particularly so if one interprets the rights of the
corporation in accordance with the aggregate theory. 252
In addition, intellectual property law protects group
interests where the owner is not a natural person.
Geographical indications can protect collective rights that do
not necessarily pertain to a natural person. A geographical
indication identifies a good as originating in a particular
region or locality, where a given “quality, reputation or other
characteristic of the good is essentially attributable to its
geographical origin.” 253 In the United States, geographical
indications are protected as certification marks under the
Lanham Act. 254 A certification mark is used by someone other
than the owner of the mark and serves to indicate the source
of the good. 255 The right to use a geographical indication may
be given to a natural or legal person, but the holder of the
right will often be a governmental or non-governmental
organization, rather than a natural person. These rights are
particularly pertinent to the discussion about a human rights
framework because geographical indications have been
proposed as one way to protect traditional knowledge that has
not otherwise been protected under the current intellectual
property system. 256
249. General Comment No. 17, supra note 55.
250. Id.
251. Id.
252. See Millon, supra note 229.
253. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 8, art. 22 (defining geographical
indications as “indications which identify a good as originating in the territory
of a Member, or a region or locality in that territory, where a given quality,
reputation or other characteristic of the good is essentially attributable to its
geographical origin.”).
254. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1052, 1127, 2054 (2012).
255. 15 U.S.C. § 1127.
256. Daniel J. Gervais, Traditional Knowledge: Are We Closer to the
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One could argue that a human right to intellectual
property protection should pertain to the creator or the
“author” of the work. 257 In patent law for instance, inventors
are presumed to be natural persons. 258 However, it would be
necessary to address the fact that copyright law, for instance,
sometimes distinguishes the legal creator and owner of the
work from the physical creator of the work. Under the workfor-hire doctrine, for example, the copyright belongs to the
person who commissioned the work rather than the artist. 259
The law treats the commissioner of the work, and not the
artist, as the author. 260 Likewise, if the work is made in the
course of employment, the copyright belongs to the employer
rather than the employee. 261 To the extent that a trademark
could be considered a literary or artistic production, the
human right to the material and moral interests could
encompass trademark as well. Trademark law, however,
provides protection to the user of the mark, not necessarily
the creator of the mark. 262
Of course, a human right to the creative work does not
have to follow the same path as the legal right. In such a
case, a human right to intellectual property might constrain
the legal owner of the work from taking certain actions with
regard to the work. This could create a balancing effect by
forcing the legal owner to accommodate human rights
principles. On the other hand, there may be reasons for a
human right to intellectual property to follow the legal route
and treat the person who commissioned the work, whether it

Answer(s)? The Potential Role of Geographical Indications, ILSA J. INT’L &
COMP. L. 551, 563 (2009).
257. UDHR, supra note 10, art. 27(2).
258. Sean M. O’Connor, Speech, Authorship, and Inventorship: A New
Approach to Corporate Personhood 35 (Univ. of Wash. Sch. of Law, Legal
Studies
Research
Working
Paper
No.
2012-03),
available
at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2016568 (“In stark contrast
to the copyright system, the patent system does not allow for corporate persons
to be inventors.
Interestingly, while it is commonly understood that
inventorship lies only in natural person inventors, nothing in the Patent Act
expressly states this.”).
259. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 201(b) (2012).
260. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 201(b).
261. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 201(b); Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490
U.S. 730 (1989).
262. GRAEME B. DINWOODIE & MARK D. JANIS, TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR
COMPETITION: LAW & POLICY 306–07 (3d ed. 2010).
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is a natural or legal person, as the creator of the work.
Unlike moral rights, which are arguably pertinent only to
natural persons, the protection of a proprietary or pecuniary
interest could reasonably extend to legal persons. This is
because property owners, and individuals with some kind of
proprietary interest, can be legal or natural persons. The
language of Article 17 of the UDHR suggests that both
individuals and groups have a right to own property. Thus,
whether one views a corporation as an individual or as a
collective of human individuals, 263 there is some basis for
corporations to claim property rights under the rubric of
human rights.
Moreover, the rationale for protecting
property rights as fundamental rights may be equally
applicable to natural and legal persons. 264 It has been
suggested that the inclusion of corporate interests under
European human rights law is due to recognition that the
ability of governments to arbitrarily deprive any group of
their possessions would undermine the rule of law. 265 Thus,
the potential for corporations to successfully justify stronger
intellectual property protections by framing their claims
using human rights concepts is a relevant consideration to
the potential impact of a human rights framework for
intellectual property. 266 The tendency for intellectual property
owners will be to focus on their human right to intellectual
property protection rather than contemplating ways to limit
their ownership interests. Before concluding, this Article
offers some preliminary thoughts on ways to limit corporate
claims within the context of a human rights framework.

263. Applying aggregate theory or the natural entity theory of the
corporation, respectively.
264. HELFER & AUSTIN, supra note 21, at 62 (“In particular, the treaties’
drafters understood that the rule of law in general and the stability and
predictability of property rights in particular would be undermined if
governments could arbitrarily deprive any class of owners of their possessions,
although they also recognized that states should have considerable leeway to
adopt and modify economic and social policies that adversely affect private
property interests.”).
265. Id.
266. Id. (“Claims involving corporate property violations . . . allege that
human rights law requires more extensive protection of inventions, trademarks,
and creative works.”).
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B. Limiting Corporate Claims
As in the Budweiser case, legal persons may seek to
protect their intellectual property under human rights law.
Alternatively, legal persons could adopt human rights
principles or framing in order to strengthen their intellectual
property claims. Rather than discounting the possibility of
corporate claims, it is worth contemplating how to limit the
scope of potential corporate claims, if this is indeed the goal.
One possible approach is to completely disaggregate the
ownership of the intellectual property from the human rights
aspects of the intellectual property. Since there will always
be a natural person creator, it would be possible to always
attribute any intellectual-property-related human right back
to the human creator but not to the owner of the intellectual
property. If the human rights aspect of the intellectual
property always relates back to the creator, rather than the
owner of the right, then even if there is a strengthened
intellectual property right, it will remain with the natural
person. 267 For instance, purchasing intellectual property
protected goods does not amount to a transfer of the
intellectual property right, or any associated human rights.
The transfer of the physical good is distinct from the transfer
of the intellectual property right. Likewise, the transfer of
ownership in an intellectual property right could be
distinguished from the transfer of any associated human
right.
Thus, while corporations could own intellectual property
rights, any associated human right, including the property
right, could remain with the human creator. This does not
alleviate possibility of having a more entrenched right, but it
is one possible way to limit claims by legal persons. This is
also more consistent with the common understanding of
human rights as being based on the inherent dignity of the
human person. The challenge that arises with distinguishing
between the owner and the creator is that, as discussed
previously, there may be instances where the work is the
result of collaboration and the creator is a legal person or a
267. This could make the transfer of intellectual property rights highly
complicated. Since human rights are inalienable, one would expect the human
right to the intellectual property protection to be non-transferable, despite the
transferability of the legal right.
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group of persons rather than a single natural person. Under
the aggregate theory of the corporation, it is more difficult to
argue that we should limit the rights of the corporate entity,
or any collective of individuals than it would be under the
concession theory of the corporation.
Yet, a human right to intellectual property protection
does not need to follow the path of intellectual property law.
Work for hire, for example, does not need to have any place in
the human rights and intellectual property framework. If
human rights protection to the moral and material interests
in creative products takes a route of its own, this distinction
could be helpful in reducing concerns about potential
corporate capture of the human rights lens. Nonetheless,
there are risks to promoting a human right to intellectual
property.
Since none of the pertinent human rights
instruments speaks of intellectual property per se, it is
possible, and preferable, to refrain from merging these two
distinct areas of law.
CONCLUSION
The implications of a human rights framework depend on
whether the framework is used to limit intellectual property
rights or to promote a human right to intellectual property
protection. Framing intellectual property rights as human
rights could alter our perception and treatment of these
rights. The effect of characterizing patents, trademarks, and
copyrights as property rights is indicative of the importance
of framing. 268 In light of the European approach to corporate
human rights, the global trend towards increased intellectual
property rights, and the treatment of corporate rights under
European and American law, it is difficult to discount
corporations in the dialogue about a human rights
framework. 269 The concept of a human right to intellectual
property protection may facilitate the ability of intellectual
property owners, many of whom are transnational
corporations, to assert that they have fundamental property

268. See generally Carrier, supra note 79, at 5.
269. See generally Annheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Portugal, App. No. 73049/01, 45
Eur. H.R. Rep. 36 (Grand Chamber 2007); Citizens United v. Fed. Election
Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010); Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct.
2751, 2775–83 (2014).
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interests in their patents, copyrights, or trademarks.
The greatest appeal of the human rights approach and
the greatest prospect for human rights to have a moderating
effect on intellectual property law is in the use of human
rights to limit intellectual property protection where
intellectual property rules negatively affect human rights
interests. The potential downside of adopting a human rights
approach is most evident with respect to use of the framework
to promote intellectual property protection. For this reason,
an author’s human right to the protection of the moral and
material interests resulting from any scientific, literary or
artistic production should be recognized as distinct from the
existing intellectual property protection. Human rights law
can counter intellectual property law where the two come into
conflict, but these two areas of law should not be merged,
even if the goal is to promote greater balance.

